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In 2014, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed in Mission Institution v Khela that the
standard of review for administrative procedures is correctness. Despite the seeming finality of
the decision, case law has demonstrated tensions and ambiguities on the matter. Tracing the
origins of this standard, the author demonstrates that this recent call for correctness conflicts
with previous calls for deference and with other aspects of contemporary administrative law
doctrines. In addressing these conflicting decisions, the authorargues that applying the correctness
standard to all procedural questions is undesirable as a matter of principle and would lead to
unnecessary confusion. The appropriate degree of scrutiny that courts should apply to agencies'
procedural choices will vary according to a number offactors, including legislative wording, the
general or statute-specific nature of the procedural protections invoked and the type of decision-
making process at issue. The author argues that courts can better take these factors into account
by subjecting agencies'procedural choices to a robust form of reasonableness review.
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Introduction
In recent years, a subtle shift has occurred in the way Canadian courts
talk about administrative procedures. In a series of cases, judges of the
Supreme Court of Canada have stated that questions of procedural fairness
are to be reviewed according to a "correctness" standard. This formulation
originated in a series of obiter dicta by Binnie J and was enshrined in a
ratio decidendi by LeBel J on behalf of a unanimous Court in Mission
Institution v Khela.1 Correctness review of administrative procedures now
appears to be the law in Canada.
Terms such as "correctness" and "standards of review" are borrowed
from cases concerning the substantive aspects of administrative decisions.
When applied to procedural questions, such terms invite judges to draw
analogies between procedural and substantive review. "Correctness
review" implies that the analysis of administrative procedures, like
substantive correctness review, should be characterized by an absence of
deference.
However, the cases on this point contain important tensions and
ambiguities. Despite its endorsement of a correctness tandard, the Court
has also held that reviewing courts should show deference to agencies'
procedural choices. Moreover, in many cases there are good reasons for
such deference, grounded in legislative intent, as well as in the relative
institutional strengths and weaknesses of courts and agencies. I therefore
1. 2014 SCC 24, [2014] 1 SCR 502.
(2016) 41:2 Queen's LU
argue that there is no sound basis for an across-the-board application of a
correctness standard to all procedural questions.
I also argue that subjecting all procedural decisions to a correctness
standard would establish too great a dichotomy between procedural
and substantive decisions.' Such a dichotomy is problematic because the
boundary between process and substance is not always clear. The Court's
invocation of a correctness standard for procedural questions, combined
with the application (since Dunsmuirv New Brunswick) of a reasonableness
standard for most substantive questions, means that the standard of review
is likely to depend on somewhat arbitrary classifications of decisions
as procedural or substantive. This state of affairs makes judicial review
unpredictable and potentially subject to manipulation.
Paul Daly made a similar argument based on the primacy of legislative
intent. He contrasts courts' fidelity to legislative intent in the substantive
realm with their relative indifference in the procedural realm. This
inconsistency is the focus of his critique as well as the starting point for his
reconstructive efforts. I share Daly's concern about courts' heavy reliance
on a process/substance dichotomy. However, the inconsistency between
procedural and substantive review is secondary to my overall argument.
My main arguments are, first, that the application of a correctness
standard to all procedural questions would be inconsistent with previous
cases, and second, that such an approach would be inappropriate,
regardless of the standard of review applied to substantive questions.
There are various reasons why it would be inappropriate. Some of
these reasons have to do with respect for legislative intent, as Daly has
argued. However, other reasons have to do with the relative institutional
capacities of courts and agencies-what Daly has elsewhere referred to
as "practical" justifications for deference.4 Although external review
is important, courts are not always well placed to assess the fairness of
agencies' procedures.
I give context to these arguments in Part I by summarizing the
recent trend and tracing its origins. I acknowledge that the idea of
2. See Paul Daly, "Canada's Bipolar Administrative Law: Time for Fusion" (2014) 40:1
Queen's LJ 213 [Daly, "Canada's Bipolar Administrative Law"].
3. 2008 SCC 9 at para 63, [2008] 1 SCR 190.
4. Paul Daly, A Theory of Deference in Administrative Law: Basis, Application and Scope
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012) at 70-136 [Daly, Theory of Deference].
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procedural correctness review seems to echo the older notion that
breaches of natural justice constitute jurisdictional errors. I maintain,
however, that this older notion should be abandoned as it provides
an incoherent basis for contemporary doctrine. Finally, I explore the
meaning of correctness review in the substantive context, explaining what
it would mean to subject procedural questions to a correctness standard.
In Part II of this article, I highlight the ambiguities and tensions in
the cases on standards of review for procedural questions. I show that the
SCC's recent insistence on correctness coexists uneasily with previous calls
for deference. In Part III, I explore the formal and institutional arguments
that can be offered in support of correctness review of procedures. I
show that these arguments are not always persuasive. While correctness
review may be justified with regard to certain kinds of procedural norms
and administrative processes, it would not be appropriate in all cases. I
therefore argue that the judicial application of a correctness standard to all
procedural questions is undesirable. In Part IV, I consider the dichotomy
between procedural and substantive review in Canadian administrative
law. The application of a correctness standard to procedural questions is
somewhat incongruous, coming at a time when the Court has generally
endorsed a hands-off approach to the review of substance. I argue that the
boundary between process and substance is fuzzier than it might seem
at first glance and that this ambiguity generates an unfortunate layer of
confusion and unpredictability.
This article is primarily intended as a critique. Nevertheless, in Part V,
I offer some preliminary thoughts on how courts might resolve the
problems I have identified. In my view, courts should acknowledge that
the appropriate degree of judicial scrutiny of administrative procedures
varies depending on a number of factors, including legislative intent, the
source of the procedural norms at issue and the nature of the administrative
process under review. I suggest that the best way for courts to consider
these factors and to provide appropriate scrutiny of administrative
procedures would be through a robust form of reasonableness review.
(2016) 41:2 Queen's LJ
I. The Origins of Correctness Review of
Procedures
A. Recent Changes in Terminology
In the 2014 Khela case, the SCC signalled a shift in the terminology
used to discuss procedural fairness. This case arose from an application
for habeas corpus by a federal inmate who was transferred from medium
to maximum security.5 Justice LeBel, writing for a unanimous Court,
invalidated the transfer on procedural fairness grounds.6 The warden's
decision to transfer Mr. Khela was based on information provided by
informants. However, the warden did not disclose these statements to
Mr. Khela, nor did she provide him with an adequate summary.' In the
Court's view, this rendered the decision procedurally unfair. In arriving
at this conclusion, LeBel J declared that "the standard for determining
whether the decision maker complied with the duty of procedural fairness
will continue to be correctness".'
5. Khela, supra note 1 (the main issue before the Court was whether a federal inmate
challenging a transfer decision before a provincial superior court could have the substance
of the decision reviewed for reasonableness). The Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7,
s 18(1)(a) confers upon the Federal Court exclusive original jurisdiction to issue an
injunction, a writ of certiorari, a writ of prohibition, a writ of mandamus, a writ of quo
warranto, or to grant declaratory relief against any federal board, commission or other
tribunal. The provincial superior courts retain their inherent jurisdiction to issue writs
of habeas corpus, except with regard to members of the Canadian Forces serving outside
Canada, as specified in subsection 18(2). In R v Miller, [1985] 2 SCR 613, 24 DLR (4th)
9, the Court held that federal inmates could nevertheless invoke certiorari in aid of their
habeas corpus applications before provincial superior courts. By invoking certiorari in aid
of habeas corpus, inmates could bring the full record of the underlying decision before a
provincial superior court. However, habeas corpus is confined to questions of legality, and
certiorari had traditionally been limited to jurisdictional questions. The issue in Khela was
whether provincial superior courts, hearing habeas corpus applications with certiorari in
aid, could also consider the reasonableness of the underlying decision. The Court held that
they could. Nevertheless, the Court ultimately decided the case on procedural rather than
substantive grounds. Khela, supra note 1.
6. Ibid at paras 80, 98.
7. Ibid at para 92.
8. Ibid at para 79.
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Justice LeBel's reference to continuity is only partly accurate. Khela is
in fact the first case in which a majority of the Court, in its ratio decidendi,
has invoked a correctness tandard for procedural questions. In a number
of previous cases, the Court had maintained that "standards of review"
were reserved for substantive questions and were simply inapplicable in
the context of procedure. As Arbour J put it in Moreau-Bdrubj v New
Brunswick ffudicial Council), with regard to questions of procedural
fairness, "no assessment of the appropriate standard of judicial review"
is necessary; instead, a court should simply assess "the procedures and
safeguards required in a particular situation".9 Justice Binnie confirmed
this point in CUPE v Ontario (Minister of Labour)-the retired judges
case-declaring that "[t]he content of procedural fairness goes to the
manner in which the Minister went about making his decision, whereas
the standard of review is applied to the end product of his deliberations."10
In the early 2000s, it was widely accepted that standards of review ere
inapplicable to procedural questions." Aside from case law, confirmation
of this approach is found in British Columbia's Administrative Tribunals
Act.12 Sections 58 and 59 of that statute codify the applicable standards
of review for different kinds of administrative decisions. Substantive
questions are subject to 1990s-style correctness, reasonableness and patent
unreasonableness standards, depending on the nature of the question and
the presence or absence of a privative clause.
However, procedural questions are set apart. Whether or not a tribunal
has a privative clause, "questions about the application of common law
rules of natural justice and procedural fairness must be decided having
regard to whether, in all of the circumstances, the tribunal acted fairly".1
3
9. 2002 SCC 11 at para 74, [2002] 1 SCR 249 [Moreau-B&ube].
10. 2003 SCC 29 at para 102, [2003] 1 SCR 539.
11. See e.g. London (City) v Ayerswood Development Corp et al (2002), 167 OAC 120 at
para 10, 34 MPLR (3d) 1; Quibec (PG) c Germain Blanchard ltie, 2005 QCCA 605 at para
106, 52 Admin IR (4th) 1.
12. SBC 2004, c 45.
13. Ibid, s 58(2)(b) (this section applies to tribunals whose enabling statutes contain
privative clauses). Identical wording is used in section 59(5) with regard to tribunals whose
enabling statutes contain no privative clauses. Ibid, s 59(5).
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Indeed, whether or not a tribunal has a privative clause, procedures are
expressly excluded from the scope of correctness review. 4
Subsequent confirmation of the exclusively substantive orientation
of "standards of review" is found in Dunsmuir, in which Bastarache
and LeBel JJ, writing for the majority, rechristened the "pragmatic and
functional approach" to substantive issues as simply "the standard of
review analysis".5 Justices Bastarache and LeBel dealt with procedural
issues separately, without referring to standards of review. However, the
Khela formulation is not entirely new. It was foreshadowed in a series of
statements by Bminie J. Over the course of a decade-sometimes in obiter,
sometimes in dissenting or concurring reasons-Binmie J introduced
the language of correctness review to the Court's procedural fairness
jurisprudence.
The first such statement can be found in Ellis-Don Ltd v Ontario
(Labour Relations Board).16 Justice Binnie, in dissent, cited a passage
from Donald Brown and John Evans' loose-leaf treatise to support the
application of a correctness standard:
The respondent union argues that the Board's decision should be set aside only if it is
"patently unreasonable". This presupposes that the error was made within the Board's
jurisdiction. The appellant contends that the panel of the Board lost jurisdiction when it
called for a full Board meeting to discuss what it regards as a question of fact. Compliance
with the rules of natural justice is a legal issue. The standard of review is correctness as
noted in D. J. M. Brown and J. M. Evans, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in
Canada (loose-leaf), vol. 2, at para. 14:2300, pp. 14-14 and 14-15:
[W]hether the administrative decision-maker has breached the rules of natural
justice or the duty of procedural fairness by failing to permit any, or adequate,
participation by the person concerned will usually be assessed on the basis of
"correctness." And the presence of a privative clause will be of no consequence in
this regard.
I think this is a correct statement of the law.t
7
14. See ibid, ss 58(2)(c), 59(1). Of course, the British Columbia Administrative Tribunals
Act is not a source of the common law of judicial review. However, this legislation appears
to reflect dominant understandings of administrative law in the early 2000s.
15. Supra note 3 at para 63.
16. 2001 SCC 4, [2001] 1 SCR 221 [Ellis-Don].
17. Ibid at para 65.
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Justice Binnie continued on this theme in his concurring reasons in
Dunsmuir, signed by him alone. In these reasons, Binnie Jlisted procedural
fairness among the types of questions that should attract a correctness
standard. Justice Binnie reasoned that "a fair procedure is said to be the
handmaiden of justice" and concluded that "the courts have the final say"
on such matters.1"
In Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa just a year later,
Binnie J had the chance to reiterate his views on behalf of a majority
of the Court.9 Analyzing the relationship between standards of review
and the grounds of judicial review provided for in the Federal Courts Act,
Binnie J declared that "Dunsmuir says that procedural issues (subject to
competent legislative override) are to be determined by a court on the
basis of a correctness tandard of review".2" Here, Binnie J appears to have
been citing his own (solo) concurring reasons in Dunsmuir rather than
those of the majority, although his failure to cite a specific passage of the
judgment makes this difficult to verify. Nor did Bminie J provide any
explanation or justification for this remark; it appears that it was made in
passing-and in obiter, since procedural fairness was not at issue in Khosa.
Two years later, in Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner)
v Alberta Teachers'Association, Binnie J insisted on the same point, once
again (as in Dunsmuir) writing alone.21 Discussing the circumstances in
which a correctness or a reasonableness tandard should apply, Binnie
J stated that "[o]n issues of procedural fairness or natural justice, for
example, the courts should not defer to a tribunal's view of the extent to
which its 'home statute' permits it to proceed in what the courts conclude
is an unfair manner.""2
During his thirteen years at the Court, Binnie J thus declared four
times that a correctness standard should apply to procedural questions.
On only one of these occasions, however-in Khosa-did he do so on
behalf of a majority of the Court, although this declaration was made in
passing only and based on uncertain authority.
18. Dunsmuir, supra note 3 at para 129.
19. 2009 SCC 12, [2009] 1 SCR 339 [Khosa].
20. Ibid at para 43 [citation omitted].
21. 2011 SCC 61, [2011] 3 SCR 654 [Alberta Teachers'Association].
22. Ibid at para 82.
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Nevertheless, Binnie J's statements were influential. Some lower courts
accepted these obiter as authoritative statements of the law." This is partly
because Dunsmuir was a watershed case in Canadian administrative law.
Justices Bastarache and LeBel's majority reasons in Dunsmuir overhauled
the methodology for determining the standard of review for questions
of substance. Although Bastarache and LeBel JJ's reasons do not discuss
procedural fairness in terms of standards of review, Binnie J's concurring
reasons have been interpreted as a companion to these majority reasons.
Although LeBel J cited no authority for his declaration in Khela, his
opinion appears to be a continuation (and a confirmation) of this series
of pronouncements by Binnie J. Khela seems significant partly because it
is the first Supreme Court decision in which a judge other than Binmie J
has used the terminology of correctness review in relation to procedural
questions. It shows that other judges of the Court have embraced Bminie
J's formulation and that they have been willing to apply it, even after
Binnie J's retirement from the Court.24
According to some judges and lawyers, LeBel J's formulation in Khela
has dispelled any uncertainty about the standard of review for procedural
questions. For example, in Air Canada v Greenglass, Nadon JA cited Khela
for the proposition that "there can be no doubt that these [procedural]
issues must be assessed against a standard of correctness".25 However, as
I will explain in Part IV, below, a closer look at LeBel J's analysis reveals
certain ambiguities. Justice LeBel also held that a warden deciding to
withhold information related to a transfer decision should be "entitled
to a margin of deference".26 While ostensibly setding the issue, Khela also
reveals underlying tensions, as I shall endeavour to demonstrate below in
Part II.
23. See e.g. Irving Shipbuilding Inc v Canada (Attorney General), 2009 FCA 116 at para 26,
[2010] 2 FCR 488 [Irving Shipbuilding]; Economical Mutual Insurance Company v British
Columbia (Information andPrivacy Commissioner), 2013 BCSC 903 at para 51, 55 Admin
LR (5th) 313.
24. It remains to be seen whether other judges of the Court adhere to this approach
despite LeBel J's subsequent retirement.
25. 2014 FCA 288 at para 26, 468 N-R 184 [citation omitted].
26. Kheha, supra note 1 at para 89.
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B. Echoes of Older Concepts: Natural Justice and Jurisdiction
The Court's articulation of a correctness standard for questions of
procedural fairness appears to echo an older doctrine. For most of the
twentieth century, Canadian courts, like their British counterparts, held
that breaches of natural justice constituted jurisdictional errors. The
notion that questions of procedural fairness are reviewable on a correctness
standard appears to follow the same model, with "procedural fairness"
sitting in for "natural justice" and "correctness" for "jurisdiction".2
However, as I explain in this Part, there is no inherent link between
natural justice and jurisdiction; the link between these two concepts was
artificial and historically contingent. Indeed, the Court has recognized
the artificiality of the natural justice/jurisdiction nexus several times in
the late-twentieth century. Moreover, the newer concepts are not quite
equivalent to the older ones, and must be evaluated on their own terms.
For these reasons, the older doctrine should not be used as a basis for
contemporary administrative law.
Mid-twentieth-century Canadian courts often held that breaches
of natural justice were to be treated as jurisdictional errors. The SCC
confirmed the jurisdictional nature of natural justice questions in a series
of cases in the 1950s and 1960s. Most of these cases arose from decisions
of labour boards with regard to union certification. Such decisions were
typically protected by strong privative clauses.
In the leading case, Toronto Newspaper Guild, Local 87v Globe Printing
Co, an employer alleged that a number of workers had resigned from the
union prior to the board's certification decision.2" If these resignations
had indeed occurred, they would have placed the union in a minority
position and made it ineligible for certification. The employer asked
the Board for permission to cross-examine the union's secretary with
regard to membership. The Board refused. A majority of the Court
ultimately held that this refusal amounted to a breach of natural justice.29
27. For contemporary examples of the persistence of the older concepts, see Mastrocola c
Autoritides marchisfinanciers, 2010 QCCS 1243 at para 31, 4 Admin IR (5th) 1; Volochay
v College ofMassage Therapists ofOntario, 2011 ONSC 2225, 30 Admin LBR (5th) 327, rev'd
2012 ONCA 541, 111 OR (3d) 561.
28. [1953] 2 SCR 18, [1953] 3 DLR 561 [Globe Printing cited to SCR].
29. See ibid at 30-38. For an additional example, see Quebec Labour Relations Board v J
PascalHardware Co Ltd, [1965] BR 791, 1965 CarswellQue 193 (WL Can) (CA).
(2016) 41:2 Queen's LJ
The majority specified, moreover, that such a breach amounted to a
jurisdictional error, declaring that the board had "refused to enter upon
the question" and had thus "declined jurisdiction"."
The idea that breaches of natural justice could constitute jurisdictional
errors was also invoked to protect workers' collective bargaining rights.
In a decision issued concurrently with Globe Printing, the Court held
that the Quebec Labour Relations Board had "acted without jurisdiction"
when it had decertified a union at an employer's request without giving
the union a chance to be heard.31 On one occasion, the Court also
assimilated natural justice to jurisdictional concerns outside the context
of labour relations. In Board of Health, Saltfleet Township v Knapman,
the Court overturned the decision of a local board of health that had
ordered the evacuation of rental properties without first hearing from
the landlord.32 Mid-twentieth-century Canadian courts thus explained
the "jurisdictional" nature of natural justice concerns by reformulating
them in substantive terms. It was held that a refusal to receive certain
evidence could amount to a refusal to verify whether all of the statutory
preconditions for the exercise of jurisdiction were in place, and thus a
"declining" of jurisdiction.
By the mid-1970s, the notion that breaches of natural justice constituted
a species of jurisdictional error had sufficiently crystallized that Laskin
CJC could declare in the pages of a United Kingdom law journal that
[o]n one issue, Canadian judges have been unanimous in refusing to pay heed to privative
clauses, whatever be their differences on other issues, and that is where natural justice is
involved. There is agreement that natural justice goes to jurisdiction, whatever be the stage
of the proceeding at which there is a failure to observe it.33
30. See Globe Printing, supra note 28 at 35.
31. Alliance des Professeurs Catholiques deMontrdal v Quebec Labour Relations Board, [1953]
2 SCR 140 at 157, Kerwin J, 163, Rand J, 169, Fauteux J, [1953] 4 DLR 161.
32. [1956] SCR 877, 6 DLR (2d) 81.
33. See Bora Laskin, "English Law in Canadian Courts since the Abolition of Privy
Council Appeals" (1976) 29:1 Current Leg Probs 1 at 16-17. In the same passage, Laskin
CJC acknowledged that
[o]f course, this consensus merely identifies the problem; it does not resolve the
difficulties involved in determining what natural justice means under particular
legislation and in a particular proceeding, and whether there has been such a
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Indeed, as late as the 1980s and 1990s, the Court continued to treat
breaches of natural justice as jurisdictional errors, at least in the context
of labour arbitrators hearing the grievances of individual workers in a
collective bargaining context.4
Despite the apparent solidity of this doctrine, the link between natural
justice and jurisdiction is the product of a historical contingency. The two
concepts originated at different times and were meant to serve different
purposes.
The concept of jurisdiction in the law of judicial review can be traced
back to struggles for constitutional supremacy in England during the
late-seventeenth century.5 During the Stuart Restoration, Parliament
began to assign a wide variety of functions to justices of the peace and
other minor officials. Moreover, Parliament began to enact privative
clauses, statutory provisions exempting the decisions of certain officials
from judicial review.6 These moves raised the hackles of the Court of
King's Bench, whose judges claimed the power to review the actions of
all state officials. These judges thus began to expand the writ of certiorari,
which previously had a rather restricted use, into a general mechanism for
judicial review. Moreover, the Court of King's Bench gradually reframed
the availability of certiorari in terms of the concept of jurisdiction. This
concept enabled the court to circumvent privative clauses. In essence,
the court held that Parliament could not have intended officials to be
the ultimate arbiters of their own jurisdictional boundaries because
this would, in effect, allow them to exceed the intended boundaries.
failure to observe it as to justify the quashing of a decision. There is, generally, a
reluctance to invoke the discretionary side of certiorari or its equivalents in order
to deny relief where there has been a failure to accord natural justice.
Ibid.
34. See e.g. Roberval Express Ltie v Transport Drivers, Warehousemen and General Workers
Union, Local 106, [1982] 2 SCR 888, 144 DLR (3d) 673 ("[a] refusal to hear admissible and
relevant evidence is so clear a case of excess or refusal to exercise jurisdiction that it needs
no further comment" at 904); Universitidu Qujbeca Trois-Rivires cLarocque, [1993] 1 SCR
471, 101 DLR (4th) 494 ("[a] breach of the rules of natural justice is regarded in itself as an
excess of jurisdiction and consequently there is no doubt that such a breach opens the way
for judicial review" at 490).
35. See Amnon Rubinstein, Jurisdiction and Illegality: A Study in Public Law (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1965) at 61-74.
36. See ibid at 71-72.
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The writ of certiorari thus came to be associated with jurisdictional
review, and was held to be applicable only where lower courts and state
officials had exceeded their jurisdiction.7
As Roderick Macdonald pointed out, natural justice and its
component principles-audi alterem partem and nemo Judex in sua causa-
have their own distinct history." The prominence of these concepts
in UK administrative law dates from the late-nineteenth century. It
was at that time in Britain that Parliament began to assign fact-finding,
decision-making and regulatory powers to a wide range of boards and
commissions. UK courts then began to imply procedural requirements
for these bodies.9 The courts formulated the principles of natural justice
as they strove to develop a theory of adjudication and to assert their
control over inferior tribunals.
However, in order to control the procedures used by boards and
commissions, UK courts had to circumvent privative clauses. This meant
assimilating the concept of natural justice to the concept of jurisdiction.
For example, it was held that an agency's attempt to limit the evidence
before it-a refusal to follow court-like procedures-could be construed
as refusal to decide a substantive question: "declining to enter upon an
inquiry on which [it] was bound to enter"4" and thus a "declining of
jurisdiction".41 Nineteenth-century UK courts thus circumvented privative
clauses by refraining natural justice in terms of substantive concerns and
characterizing these concerns as "jurisdictional". The treatment of natural
justice as a jurisdictional issue is a product of this historical contingency.
Indeed, the artificiality of the natural justice/jurisdiction nexus was
sometimes recognized by late-twentieth-century Canadian courts. These
courts recognized that natural justice did not have to be treated as a
jurisdictional issue. The flexibility of the concept of jurisdiction made it
possible for judges to ignore or overlook minor procedural problems. On
three occasions during the 1950s and 1960s, the SCC held that breaches of
37. See e.g. ibid at 71-74. See also SA de Smith, JudicidalReview ofAdministrative Action,
3d ed (London UK: Stevens & Sons, 1973) at 512-13.
38. RA Macdonald, "Judicial Review and Procedural Fairness in Administrative Law: I"
(1980) 25:4 McGill LJ 520 at 530-31, 536-37.
39. The classic case is Cooper v Wandsworth Board of Works (1863), 143 ER 414 (HL)
[Cooper].
40. R vMarsham (1891), [1892] 1 QB 371 at 375, Lord Halsbury (Eng).
41. Ibid at 378, Lord Esher.
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natural justice were insufficiently serious as to entail a loss of jurisdiction.42
During the 1970s, the Court also distinguished natural justice concerns
from subject-matter jurisdiction in the strict sense. For example, in a 1977
dissenting opinion, Spence J identified the natural justice/jurisdiction
nexus as "a mere matter of technique in determining the jurisdiction of the
Court to exercise the remedy of certiorari".43 Likewise, Dickson J, as he
then was, noted in obiter in Nurses Association that natural justice was not
a matter of "jurisdiction in the narrow sense of authority to enter upon an
inquiry".44 Instead, a breach of natural justice was something that could
occur during the course of an inquiry that would take "the exercise of
[the agency's] powers outside the protection of the privative or preclusive
clause".5 In addition, in Harelkin v University of Regina, Beetz J noted
in obiter that a breach of natural justice, while "'akin' to a jurisdictional
error", did not "entail the same type of nullity as if there had been a lack
of jurisdiction". 6 The identification of natural justice as a jurisdictional
issue is therefore arbitrary. These concepts lack any underlying unity. It
would be incoherent and misleading to base contemporary administrative
law on the idea that a breach of natural justice "goes to jurisdiction".
42. See Labour Relations Board v Traders' Service Ltd, [1958] SCR 672 at 677-78, 15 DIR
(2d) 305; Bakery and Confectionery Workers International Union ofAmerica, Local No 468
v White Lunch Ltd, [1966] SCR 282 at 295-96, 56 DLR (2d) 193; Komo Construction Inc c
Commission des Relations de Travail du Quebec (1997), [1968] SCR 172 at 175, 1 DLR (3d)
125 [Komo Construction].
43. Canada Labour Relations Board v Transair Ltd (1976), [1977] 1 SCR 722 at 747, 67
DLR (3d) 421.
44. Service Employees' International Union, Local No 333 v Nipawin District Staff Nurses
Association, [1975] 1 SCR 382 at 389, 41 DLR (3d) 6.
45. Ibid. The Court stated that:
A tribunal may, on the one hand, have jurisdiction in the narrow sense of authority
to enter upon an inquiry but, in the course of that inquiry, do something which
takes the exercise of its powers outside the protection of the privative or preclusive
clause. Examples of this type of error would include acting in bad faith, basing
the decision on extraneous matters, failing to take relevant factors into account,
breaching the provisions of natural justice or misinterpreting provisions of the Act
so as to embark on an inquiry or answer a question not remitted to it.
Ibid at 389. Note that Dickson J was paraphrasing language used by Lord Reid in Anisminic
v Foreign Compensation Commission, [1968] UKHL 6 [Anisminic].
46. [1979] 2 SCR 561 at 585, 96 DLR (3d) 14.
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Moreover, natural justice and jurisdiction have both waned in
importance since the 1970s, and the concepts that have replaced them are not
quite equivalent. The Court's recognition of a general duty of procedural
fairness in Nicholson v Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Police Commissioners
has made the notion of natural justice somewhat redundant.4 Indeed, in
Martineau v Matsqui Institution Disciplinary Board, Dickson CJC opined
that "[iun general, courts ought not to seek to distinguish between the two
concepts, for the drawing of a distinction between a duty to act fairly,
and a duty to act in accordance with the rules of natural justice, yields an
unwieldy conceptual framework."" Contemporary Canadian courts still
invoke the rules of natural justice, and the classic natural justice principles
of audi alterem partem and nemo Judex in sua causa continue to structure
courts' analysis of procedural fairness. But a flexible, context-sensitive
notion of procedural fairness has become the dominant concept.
A similar point can be made for jurisdiction. In the landmark case
CUPE v New Brunswick Liquor Corporation, Dickson J, as he then was,
commented on the difficulty of isolating "jurisdictional" issues and
warned that "[tihe courts, in my view, should not be alert to brand as
jurisdictional, and therefore subject to broader curial review, that which
may be doubtfully so."49 In Pushpanathan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), the Court all but abolished the formal concept of
jurisdiction, stating that a "jurisdictional question" was simply a question
calling for the application of a correctness standard, depending on the
outcome of the four-factor pragmatic and functional approach." The
Court reintroduced a narrow concept of jurisdiction in Dunsmuir,51 but
the Court has since expressed misgivings about this category.52
It must be acknowledged that the Khela formulation appears to restate
an old (and at one point, well-established) administrative law doctrine.
However, it would be a mistake to treat this older doctrine as a precedent
for correctness review of procedures. The older doctrine was historically
47. (1978), [1979] 1 SCR 311, 88 DLR (3d) 671 [Nicholson cited to SCR].
48. (1979), [1980] 1 SCR 602 at 629, 106 DLR (3d) 385 [Martineau].
49. Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 963 v New Brunswick Liquor Corp, [1979] 2
SCR 227 at 233, 25 NBR (2d) 237.
50. [1998] 1 SCR 982 at para 28, 160 DLR (4th) 193 [Pushpanathan]. But see Chieu v
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 3 at para 24, [2002] 1 SCR 84.
51. Supra note 3 at para 59.
52. See Alberta Teachers'Association, supra note 21 at paras 33-43, Rothstein J.
D. McKee
contingent and contested and its component parts have been replaced by
newer (and different) concepts. In order to understand the Court's recent
formulation, we must examine it on its own terms.
C. Correctness Review of Substance as a Model
What does it mean to say that administrative procedures must
be assessed according to a correctness standard? The Court initially
developed the correctness standard for substantive questions. Substantive
correctness review therefore provides the obvious model for procedural
correctness review. In brief, correctness review is characterized by an
absence of deference. It is usually (but not exclusively) applied to legal
questions. The Court has stated that, when undertaking correctness
review of substance, a reviewing court should conduct its own analysis to
determine the right answer to the substantive question at hand.53 It should
then see whether the agency arrived at the same answer. If not, the court
should hold the agency's decision to be incorrect, and thus invalid.5 4
This analytic process can be contrasted with that of reasonableness
review. When reviewing the reasonableness of administrative decisions,
courts start by examining the reasons given by the administrative decision
maker. They ask whether these reasons provide an adequate basis for the
decision.55 When undertaking reasonableness review, courts are meant to
grant a certain degree of deference to the agency's determination. A court
may hold an administrative decision to be reasonable even if the court
would have resolved the matter in some other way. The reasonableness
standard is based on the recognition that questions of public administration
do not always yield a single best answer.56
Paul Daly has argued that the concepts of deference and correctness
review need not be mutually exclusive. Daly distinguishes between
"epistemic deference" and "doctrinal deference". He explains that
courts employ epistemic deference when they accord a certain amount
of weight to an agency's perspective. Doctrinal deference, on the other
53. See Law Society of New Brunswick v Ryan, 2003 SCC 20 at para 50, [2003] 1 SCR 247
[Ryan].
54. See Dunsmuirv New Brunswick, supra note 3 at para 50.
55. See Ryan, supra note 53 at paras 49, 54-56.
56. See ibid at para 51; Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, supra note 3 at para 47.
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hand, requires courts to recognize that agencies have their own spheres
of authority, protected from judicial intervention to some extent.5 While
doctrinal deference implies some form of reasonableness review, Daly
suggests that a certain amount of epistemic deference may be compatible
with correctness review. A court applying a correctness standard could
consider the agency's perspective just as it would consider any other
relevant matter."
While I agree with Daly in principle, I would suggest that Canadian
courts have generally understood correctness review to be stricter than
what he describes-involving a complete absence of deference. When
applying a correctness standard, courts have often given little, if any,
weight to agencies' perspectives. They have rather treated correctness
review as an opportunity to substitute their own views for those of the
agency. In Rogers Communications Inc v Society of Composers, Authors and
Music Publishers of Canada, for example, Rothstein J applied a correctness
standard, upholding the Copyright Board's decision as correct, in part.
59
In so doing, Rothstein J made only passing reference to the Copyright
Board's interpretive approach." Likewise, in McCormick v Fasken
Martineau DuMoulin LLP, applying a correctness standard, Abella J
referred to the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal's reasoning
only to point out its flaws.61
Courts have most often applied a correctness standard to questions
of law. Substantive correctness review is descended from jurisdictional
review, as practiced by Canadian courts in the 1960s and 1970s.62 Under the
dominant approach to judicial review at that time, a correctness standard
was applied to all questions that fell outside the agency's jurisdiction
(and thus outside the protection of the privative clause, if there was one).
Courts undertaking jurisdictional review therefore emphasized questions
of statutory interpretation; they saw themselves as policing the boundaries
of agencies' legislative mandates. The association of correctness review
57. See Daly, Theory of Deference, supra note 4 at 7-13.
58. See ibid at 138-39.
59. 2012 SCC 35, [2012] 2 SCR 283 [Rogers].
60. See ibid at paras 27-28.
61. 2014 SCC 39 at para 44, [2014] 2 SCR 108.
62. See e.g. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co v International Union of Operating Engineers,
Local 796, [1970] SCR 425, 11 DLR (3d) 336; Bell v Ontario Human Rights Commission,
[1971] SCR 756, 18 DLR (3d) 1.
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with legal questions is even clearer in the UK, where, since 1969, the
concept of jurisdictional error (and hence correctness review) has been
expanded to encompass almost all errors of law."
From the late 1980s to the early 2000s, under the Court's "pragmatic
and functional approach," the law/fact distinction was one of four factors
used to determine the standard of review for substantive questions (along
with the presence or absence of a privative clause, the agency's expertise
vis-ai-vis that of the reviewing court, and the purpose of the statute).64
The characterization of an issue as "purely" legal militated for a higher
standard of review under the pragmatic and functional approach.65
Likewise, the identification of a "mixed" question of law and fact would in
principle prompt a court to determine whether it contained more factual
or legal elements, with corresponding effects on the standard of review.66
However, the law/fact distinction was not determinative, and the standard
of review could depend on other factors.6 Nevertheless, courts tended to
undertake correctness review when dealing with "general" questions of
law,6" including constitutional questions.6 9
63. This development began with Anisminic, supra note 45, in which the House of
Lords adopted an expansive approach to jurisdictional error. The House of Lords later
modulated the application of this approach according to the type of body subject to review,
applying it more strictly to administrative agencies and less strictly to inferior courts. See
ReRacal Communications Ltd, [1980] UKHL 5. In 1993, the House of Lords confirmed the
Anisminic approach to errors of law, but qualified it somewhat by specifying that decisions
should only be overturned for errors on "relevant" points of law-i.e., errors with an
impact on the decision. See R v Hull University Visitor, exparte Page, [1992] UKHL 12. In
the same year, the House of Lords also held that courts should grant a margin of deference
to agencies in their interpretation of vague statutory standards. See R v Monopolies and
Mergers Commission, exparte South Yorkshire Transport Ltd, [1993] 1 All ER 289 (HL).
64. See e.g. Pushpanathan, supra note 50 at paras 29-38.
65. See e.g. ibid at para 37; Dr Q v College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia,
2003 SCC 19 at para 34, [2003] 1 SCR 226 [Dr Q]; Barrie Public Utilities v Canadian Cable
Television Assn, 2003 SCC 28 at para 16, [2003] 1 SCR 476.
66. See e.g. Dr Q, supra note 65 at para 34.
67. See e.g. Pasiechnyk v Saskatchewan (Workers' Compensation Board), [1997] 2 SCR 890,
149 DLR (4th) 577 (in which the presence of a full privative clause and other factors led
the Court to apply a patent unreasonableness standard to a question of law). See also Baker
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817 at para 58, 174 DLR
(4th) 193 [Baker].
68. See e.g. Canada (Attorney General) vMossop, [1993] 1 SCR 554, 100 DLR (4th) 658.
69. See e.g. Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation Board) v Martin; Nova Scotia (Workers'
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Dunsmuir restored the pre-eminence of the law/fact distinction in
the determination of the standard of review. In Dunsmuir, the Court
made reasonableness the default standard for questions of fact as well as
"questions where the legal and factual issues are intertwined with [sic] and
cannot be readily separated"." Dunsmuir also established reasonableness
as the appropriate standard for certain legal questions (i.e., questions
of the interpretation of the agency's home statute). Since Dunsmuir,
the correctness standard is reserved for a limited set of legal questions:
constitutional questions, questions of jurisdiction, questions of general
law, and questions of overlapping statutory mandates.1 In contemporary
Canadian administrative law, the availability of correctness review thus
remains linked to the legal (as opposed to factual) nature of the question,
although the standards have shifted.
The legal nature of the questions at stake is at the heart of the
justifications typically offered for substantive correctness review.
Substantive correctness review is often informed by formal rule of law
concerns. By applying a strict standard to agency decisions, courts strive
to ensure the coherence and integrity of the legal system as a whole. The
Court has expressed this concern most clearly in its prescription for
correctness review of constitutional questions2 and "general" questions of
law." Seen in this light, courts reviewing administrative decisions perform
a function analogous to that of appellate courts reviewing lower court
decisions: standardizing legal interpretation (and therefore granting no
deference).7" As a majority of the Court declared in Dunsmuir, correctness
review "avoids inconsistent and unauthorized application of law"."
Diceyan constitutional theory takes this argument a step further,
emphasizing judges' unique constitutional role. According to A.V. Dicey,
the rule of law includes the baseline principle of equality before the law,
meaning that state officials are subject to the "ordinary" law, except as
otherwise specified by statute. When officials exceed their statutory
powers, they are on the same footing as any other citizen, having
Compensation Board) v Laseur, 2003 SCC 54, [2003] 2 SCR 504.
70. Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, supra note 3 at para 53.
71. Ibid at paras 58-61.
72. See ibid at para 58.
73. See ibid at para 60.
74. See e.g. Housen v Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33 at paras 8-10, [2002] 2 SCR 235.
75. Supra note 3 at para 50.
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interfered with others' rights, and may be held personally liable before the
"ordinary" courts.6 According to this theory, the judiciary must resolve
any ambiguities in agencies' mandates without regard to administrators'
own assessments of their powers.
Substantive correctness review has also been justified in terms of
the relative institutional capacities of courts and agencies. Courts have
sometimes insisted on correctness review on the grounds that judges are
the foremost experts on legal questions." In mainstream contemporary
Canadian administrative law opinion, this institutional argument survives
only in a qualified form. It is acknowledged that specialized administrative
agencies may be more expert han generalist courts with regard to certain
legal questions, especially those involving the interpretation of their
"home" statutes.78 Nevertheless, the "legal" nature of a question remains
an argument against deference.
7
1
Substantive correctness review, as described here, provides the
prototype for correctness review in general. The application of acorrectness
standard to procedural questions would presumably proceed along
similar lines. Courts would grant no deference to agencies in procedural
matters. However, as I shall endeavour to show in the following Parts,
there are doctrinal as well as theoretical reasons for skepticism about such
an approach.
II. Tensions in the Procedural Fairness Case
Law
As I have already noted, Khela contains an ambiguity. While
enshrining a correctness standard for procedural questions, LeBel J also
invoked the possibility of a "margin of deference". In fact, this ambiguity
is symptomatic of deeper tensions in the procedural fairness case law.
76. AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10th ed (London
UK: Macmillan, 1961) at 193-94.
77. See e.g. Pushpanathan, supra note 50 at para 37; Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, supra
note 3, Deschamps J ("superior courts have a core expertise to interpret questions of law"
at para 162).
78. Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, supra note 3 at paras 54-55.
79. See e.g. Rogers, supra note 59 at para 20.
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Despite the Court's recent insistence on a correctness tandard, it has also
endorsed judicial deference on a number of occasions.
In the following discussion, I am mainly concerned with common
law procedural requirements."0  While legislators have sometimes
stipulated procedures for agencies to follow, many of the requirements of
procedural fairness (and formerly, natural justice) have been generated by
courts themselves. The classic statement in Cooper v Wandsworth Board
of Works, that the "justice of the common law will supply the omission
of the legislature," still informs courts' approach to procedural fairness81
The judge-made requirements of natural justice or procedural fairness are
understood as a set of default rules. Legislators may derogate from these
rues, but only if they do so expressly.2 Otherwise, courts will imply the
procedural requirements derived from common law.
As noted in Part I, above, UK judges in the late-nineteenth century
began to apply the rules of natural justice to newly created administrative
agencies. In the early-twentieth century, however, British judges
nevertheless adopted a posture of restraint with regard to administrative
procedures. This trend began with the House of Lords' decision in Local
Government Board v Arlidge,8 3 in which Lord Shaw opined that it was
inappropriate to impose court-like procedures on government agencies.
This restraint eventually crystallized in the rule that only judicial or quasi-
judicial functions were subject to review for conformity with the rules
of natural justice.4 Moreover, the House of Lords held that an agency
exercising administrative functions was "master of its own procedure"."
Canadian courts followed the lead of British courts in this regard.6
80. For the purposes of this article, I am focusing on statutory and common law procedural
requirements. For the sake of brevity and clarity, I have chosen to bracket the question of
constiutionalized procedures (such as those required by section 7 of the Canadian Charter
ofRights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada
Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11).
81. Cooper, supra note 39 at 420, Lord Byles.
82. See e.g. Knight v Indian Head School Division No 19, [1990] 1 SCR 653 at 667-81, 69
DLR (4th) 489 [Knight]; Ocean Port Hotel Ltd v British Columbia (General Manager, Liquor
Control and Licensing Branch), 2001 SCC 52 at para 27, [2001] 2 SCR 781.
83. (1914), [1915] AC 120 (Eng). See generally de Smith, supra note 37 at 142-51.
84. See R v Electricity Commissioners, ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee Co Ltd
(1920), [1924] 1 KB 171 (Eng).
85. GeneralMedical Council v Spackman, [1943] AC 627 at 634 (Eng), Viscount Simon.
86. See e.g. Komo Construction, supra note 42, Pigeon J ("[t]out en maintentant le principe
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At first glance, such self-restraint on the part of classical liberal judges,
hostile to the expanding administrative state, seems rather surprising.
However, as David Dyzenhaus and Evan Fox-Decent have noted, this
approach has a certain logic: "One should not throw good money
after bad."" Judges effectively washed their hands of responsibility for
the fairness of administrative procedures, leaving such questions up to
Parliament.
After the Second World War, however, in the context of a growing
welfare state, British commentators began to argue that judges should
review the procedural aspects of administrative functions as well. The
distinction between administrative and judicial or quasi-judicial functions
was criticized as artificial."8 By the mid-1960s, British courts had accepted
that decision makers had a duty to be procedurally fair even when carrying
out administrative functions.8 9
The SCC endorsed the doctrine of procedural fairness in the 1979
Nicholson case. The Court held that administrative decision makers
were under a duty to act fairly, regardless of whether the function in
question could be classified as "administrative" or "quasi-judicial".9
In doing so, the Court signalled the obsolescence of the older
formal categories and the extension of judicial scrutiny to a wider
variety of functions. In subsequent cases, the Court clarified that an
obligation of procedural fairness generally arises in any public decision
que les r~gles fondamentales de justice doivent 6tre respect6es, i faut se garder d'imposer
un code de proc6dure i un organisme que la loi a voulu rendre maitre de sa proc6dure" at
176). See also Re Cedarvale Tree Services Ltd and Labourers' International Union of North
America, Local 183, [1971] 3 OR 832, 22 DLR (3d) 40 (CA) [cited to OR] ("[iut is clear to
me that under the Labour Relations Act the Board is master of its own house not only
as to all questions of fact and law falling within the ambit of the jurisdiction conferred
upon it by the Act, but with respect to all questions of procedure when acting within that
jurisdiction" at 841, Arnup JA).
87. David Dyzenhaus & Evan Fox-Decent "Rethinking the Process/Substance Distinction:
Baker v Canada" (2001) 51:3 UTLJ 193 at 203.
88. See SA de Smith, supra note 37 at 114-36. See also IIWR Wade, Administrative Law
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961) at 141-65.
89. See Ridge v Baldwin, [1963] UKHL 2.
90. Nicholson, supra note 47 at para 22. See also DJ Mullan, "Fairness: The New Natural
Justice" (1975) 25:3 UTLJ 281.
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that "affects the rights, privileges or interests of an individual".91 There are
certain exceptions, notably "legislative" decisions (interpreted broadly
to include Cabinet appeals)92 and (since 2008) decisions related to the
employment of public servants who have employment contracts.93 The
exemption has also been applied to commercial decisions.94 Formal
categories therefore still play a limited role in procedural review. A court
assessing the fairness of an administrative decision must first determine
that it crosses the procedural fairness "threshold"; i.e., it must verify that
the rights, privileges or interests of an individual are affected and that the
decision does not belong to any of the exceptions. However, in a vast
range of cases, these threshold criteria are easily satisfied.
Canadian courts' approach to administrative procedures since
Nicholson therefore corresponds to what Martin Loughlin has called
"active informalism".95 In other words, courts have shown a willingness
to intervene in agencies' processes, but they have done so on the basis
of context-sensitive assessments of fairness rather than all-or-nothing
categories. They have gauged the need for procedures in terms of the
purposes these procedures might serve.
The Court has reaffirmed the contextual approach to procedures on
numerous occasions since 1979. For example, in Knight v Indian Head
School Division No 19, the Court dealt with a school board's termination
of one of its employees, in a situation where neither the enabling statute
nor the employment contract specified any procedure to be followed. A
majority of the Court held that the school board was nevertheless subject
to a duty to act fairly. Justice L'Heureux-Dub, writing for the majority,
noted that "the concept of procedural fairness is eminently variable and
its content is to be decided in the specific context of each case".96
91. Cardinal v Director of Kent Institution, [1985] 2 SCR 643 at 653, 24 DLR (4th) 44
[Cardinal].
92. See e.g. Canada (AG) v Inuit Tapirisat et al, [1980] 2 SCR 735, [1980] 2 FCR 735.
93. See Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, supra note 3 at paras 77-117.
94. See e.g. Irving Shipbuilding, supra note 23.
95. Martin Loughlin, "Procedural Fairness: A Crisis in Administrative Law Theory"
(1978) 28:2 UTLJ 215.
96. Knight, supra note 82 at 682. See also May v Ferndale Institution, 2005 SCC 82, [2005] 3
SCR 809 ("[t]he requirements of procedural fairness must be assessed contextually in every
circumstance" at para 90); Canada (Attorney General) vMavi, 2011 SCC 30 at paras 38-42,
[2011] 2 SCR 504.
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In IWA v Consolidated-Bathurst Packaging Ltd, decided that same year,
the Court continued to emphasize context." In this case, an employer
challenged the Ontario Labour Relations Board's practice of holding a
closed-door meeting of all board members to discuss policy issues arising
from a particular case. The employer charged that such a practice vitiated
the independence of the board members hearing the case and deprived the
parties of an opportunity to be heard. A majority of the Court rejected
these arguments. Explaining this decision, Gonthier J wrote that "the
rules of natural justice do not have a fixed content, irrespective of the
nature of the tribunal and of the institutional constraints it faces".9"
InBakerv Canada (Minister of Citizenship and lmmigration) , L'Heureux-
Dube J, with the unanimous support of her colleagues, established a list
of factors that courts should consider in order to determine the level of
procedural fairness required in any given instance. The list includes factors
pertaining to the statutory framework, such as the nature of the decision
being made and its place in the statutory scheme.99 It also includes case-
specific factors such as the importance of the decision to the individual
affected and the legitimate expectations of the person challenging the
decision."' Moreover, L'Heureux-Dub6 J was at pains to emphasize that
her list was not exhaustive,"' and that "[a]ll of the circumstances must be
considered in order to determine the content of the duty of procedural
fairness."
10 2
Such a contextual, fact-sensitive approach to procedural fairness is
in principle compatible with correctness review. However, L'Heureux-
Dube J concluded her list of factors in Baker by declaring:
[T]he analysis of what procedures the duty of fairness requires should also take into
account and respect the choices of procedure made by the agency itself, particularly
when the statute leaves to the decision-maker the ability to choose its own procedures, or
when the agency has an expertise in determining what procedures are appropriate in the
circumstances. While this, of course, is not determinative, important weight must be given
to the choice of procedures made by the agency itself and its institutional constraints."3
97. [1990] 1 SCR 282, 68 DLR (4th) 524.
98. Ibid at 323-24.
99. Baker, supra note 67 at paras 23-24.
100. Ibid at paras 25-26.
101. Ibid at para 28.
102. Ibid at para 21.
103. Ibid at para 27 [citations omitted].
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This "fifth factor" can be interpreted as a call for judicial deference
with regard to procedure. Understood as such, it is incompatible with
correctness review.
Indeed, in subsequent cases, the Court has sometimes linked Baker's
fifth factor to a deferential approach to procedure. For example, inMoreau-
Bdrub, the Court considered a decision of the New Brunswick Judicial
Council to remove a judge from office. The judge in question had contested
this decision, noting that an inquiry panel had initially recommended
a lesser sanction and the Council had not explicitly mentioned the
possibility of removal from office at its hearing. Justice Arbour, writing
for a unanimous Court, concluded that the Council's failure to explicitly
raise the possibility of removal from office was not procedurally unfair.
According to Arbour J, "[w]hile the Council might have opted, as part of
their procedure, to remind Judge Moreau-Berub6 that the Council would
not be bound by any recommendations made by the inquiry panel, they
chose not to, and that was within their discretion."104 Justice Arbour cited
Baker's fifth factor in support of this reasoning.
10 5
Likewise, a few years later, in Council of Canadians with Disabilities v
VIA Rail Canada Inc Abella J, citing Baker, declared:
Considerable deference is owed to procedural rulings made by a tribunal with the
authority to control its own process. The determination of the scope and content of a
duty to act fairly is circumstance-specific, and may well depend on factors within the
expertise and knowledge of the tribunal, including the nature of the statutory scheme and
the expectations and practices of the Agency's constituencies." 6
The Court has not always interpreted Baker's fifth factor as calling
for a significant degree of deference. At times, the Court has considered
agencies' procedural choices, while assigning them limited weight.
An illustration of this approach can be found in Congrigation des
timoins de Jjhovah de St-J&orme-Lafontaine v Lafontaine (Village)."' This
judgment dealt with a municipality's refusal to rezone certain land to
permit a group of Jehovah's Witnesses to use it as a place of worship.
104. Moreau-Bdrubj, supra note 9 at para 81.
105. Ibid.
106. 2007 SCC 15 at para 231, [2007] 1 SCR 650 [Council of Canadians with Disabilities].
107. 2004 SCC 48, [2004] 2 SCR 650.
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In making its decision, the municipality had failed to give reasons for
its decision. Chief Justice McLachlin, writing for a majority of the Court,
held that the decision was procedurally unfair. Applying the Baker factors
to determine the appropriate level of procedural fairness, McLachlin
CJCconcluded that the fifth factor did not carry much weight, given that
the municipality had not actually applied its expertise."' Chief Justice
McLachlin's interpretation of Baker's fifth factor is an example of what
Paul Daly has called "epistemic deference", meaning that a certain amount
of weight is accorded to the agency's procedural choices."9 Nevertheless,
the administrative decision maker is not recognized as having a protected
sphere of authority (in other words, "doctrinal deference" is absent)."'
Aside from the application of Baker's fifth factor, the Court has also
reaffirmed the idea that administrative agencies might be considered
"masters in their own house" with respect to procedure,"' even in the
post-Nicholson era. To recognize agencies as "masters in their own house"
implies the possibility of doctrinal deference and not just epistemic
deference.
The Court's calls for deference in cases such as Baker are thus in
tension with its recent endorsement of correctness review. Moreover,
lower courts have also deferred to agencies on procedural questions.
In practice, Canadian courts tend to defer to agencies on certain kinds
of questions, such as whether or not to hold an oral hearing (where
none is required by statute)."2 Courts also typically defer to agencies
with regard to the management of hearings and other decision-making
108. Ibidat para 11.
109. Daly, Theory of Deference, supra note 4.
110. See ibid.
111. Prassad v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1989] 1 SCR 560 at
568-69, 57 DLR (4th) 663 [Prassad].
112. See e.g. Baker, supra note 67 at paras 33-34; Xwave Solutions Inc v Canada (Public
Works & Government Services), 2003 FCA 301, 310 N-R 164 (dealing with the processes used
by the Canadian International Trade Tribunal); Nadeau v United Steelworkers ofAmerica,
2009 FCA 100, 400 N-R 246 (dealing with the processes used by the Canadian Industrial
Relations Board); Adetunji v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 708
at para 24, 431 FTR 71 (dealing with procedures used by an immigration officer).
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processes on issues such as the consolidation of proceedings, " 3the
size of the panel assigned to a case"1 4 or requests for adjournments."5
I would like to acknowledge (in order to dismiss) a possible counter-
argument-a way that one might plausibly argue that deference and
correctness review can be reconciled. This counter-argument is based on
an analysis of the stages involved in procedural fairness review. Courts
and commentators have typically identified two stages of procedural
fairness review. The first of these is the "threshold" stage discussed earlier.
The second is the "content" stage, in which the judge must determine
compliance with the requirements of procedural fairness in the particular
circumstances. The calls for deference I have cited, as in Baker, have been
confined to the content stage.
The counter-argument, which tries to reconcile deference and
correctness, proceeds by breaking down the "content" stage into two sub-
stages: one in which the judge determines what procedures were required
in the circumstances and another in which the judge determines whether
the agency lived up to these requirements. According to this counter-
argument, deference may be appropriate at the first of these two sub-
stages, but not at the second. Indeed, such an analysis is implicit in the
passage from Brown and Evans quoted in Ellis-Don."l6 It is also implicit
in LeBel J's statement in Khela, which specified that "the standard for
determining whether the decision maker complied with the duty ofprocedural
fairness will continue to be 'correctness'".117 In his academic writings,
Huscroft JA made this distinction explicit:
[T]here is some room for deference when it comes to determining the content of the duty
of fairness, because the procedural choices made by the decision-maker are one of the
considerations courts must take into account. However, once the content of the duty of
in a particular context has been determined, the question for the court is simply whether
113. See e.g. McNaught v Toronto Transit Commission (2005), 74 OR (3d) 278, 249 DLR
(4th) 334 (CA).
114. See Telus Communications Inc v Telecommunications Workers Union, 2005 FCA 262,
257 DLR (4th) 19. See also Faghihi v Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) (1999),
173 FTR 193, 2 Imm LR (3d) 196, aff'd 2001 FCA 163, 274 NR 358.
115. Prassad, supra note 111.
116. Ellis-Don, supra note 16.
117. Khela, supra note 1 at para 79 [emphasis added].
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the duty of fairness has been met on the facts of the case-a question that will yield a yes
or no answer.1 8
However, this separation of the "content" stage into two substages
is not generally recognized in case law. It is, in fact, inconsistent with
widespread judicial practice. In practice, courts seldom distinguish their
standard-settmig exercise from their determination of compliance with the
standards they have set. Courts often determine the content of procedural
fairness by way of reference to the procedures actually employed by the
agency: first examining the procedures, then asking if they were fair
in the circumstances. Standards of procedural fairness are thus reverse
engineered from administrative practices rather than set out in advance.
Moreover, the requirements of procedural fairness are generally
understood to establish minimum standards.9 Agencies are free to exceed
these standards if they so choose, offering greater procedural protections
to those subject to the law. A court determining compliance with
procedural fairness requirements will not seek to determine whether the
decision maker arrived at the one and only right answer to the question;
it will instead seek to determine whether the procedures employed by the
decision maker met or exceeded a minimum standard.2
118. Grant Huscroft, "From Natural Justice to Fairness: Thresholds, Content and the Role
of judicial Review" in Colleen M Flood & Lorne Sossin, eds, AdministrativeLaw in Context,
2nd ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2013) 147 at 182. It is interesting that Huscroft JA
failed to make this same distinction at another point in the same article: "It is important to
emphasize that courts require decisions about threshold and content of the duty of fairness to
be made correctly. If they are not, the substantive decision made in a particular matter will be
quashed and remitted to be made in accordance with the appropriate procedures." Jbid at 153.
119. See e.g. Nicholson, supra note 47 at 328; Cardinal, supra note 91 at 660.
120. There are also substantive provisions that take the form of minimum standards rather
than clear-cut rules. For example, in Britain, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission was
empowered to investigate mergers where the companies involved supplied at least 25% of a
particular kind of service "in a substantial part of the United Kingdom." The Commission
investigated the merger of two bus companies serving an area representing 1.65% of the
United Kingdom's land area and 3.2% of its population. The companies argued that this
area was not "substantial". The House of Lords treated this as a question of law, but it
noted the vagueness of the statutory provision and held that the question was whether the
Commission's interpretation fell within a "spectrum of possible meanings", rather than
whether the Commission had given the one and only correct answer. See R v Monopolies
and Mergers Commission, ex parte South Yorkshire Transport Ltd, [1994] ECC 231 (Eng).
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For example, in Council of Canadians with Disabilities, the Court
considered whether the Canadian Transportation Agency had breached
the requirements of procedural fairness when it ordered Via Rail to
retrofit certain rail cars to make them wheelchair accessible. The Agency
had issued this order without waiting for Via Rail to provide estimates
of the costs of such a modification. In holding that the Agency's decision
was nonetheless procedurally fair, Abella J concluded:
The Agency, following its multi-year dealings with the parties, was in the best position to
control its own process with a view to the bonafides and strategic choices of the parties.
There are no grounds for a reviewing court to interfere with the Agency's discretion to
release its final decision without waiting for VIA to produce the cost estimates."'
Indeed, in many cases, courts have followed such an approach despite
paying lip service to a correctness standard. For example, in Uniboard
Surfaces Inc v Kronotex Fussboden GmbH and Co KG, Decary JA of the
Federal Court of Appeal declared that "the determination of the content
of the duty of procedural fairness in any given case is a question of law and
is reviewable under the standard of correctness",122 but then went on to
defer to the Canada Border Services Agency's refusal to disclose the report
of its investigation into the alleged dumping by European countries. In
Thamotharem v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), the
same court invoked a correctness standard, but ultimately upheld the
fairness of the Immigration and Refugee Board's guidelines with regard
to the sequence of questioning in refugee status determination hear1igs)23
A more recent example can be found in a decision by the Quebec Court
of Appeal in a matter of professional discipline. In Murphy c Chambre de
la sjcuritjfinanclre, a financial advisor who was held to have defrauded
his clients applied for judicial review of the decision of the Chambre de
la securit6 financiere.24 The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that
the procedures employed by the Chambre should be reviewable on a
121. Council of Canadians with Disabilities, supra note 106 at para 245.
122. 2006 FCA 398 at para 6, [2007] 4 FCR 101 [Uniboard].
123. 2007 FCA 198 at paras 33, 51, 366 NR 301.
124. 2010 QCCA 1079, 89 CCLI (4th) 51.
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correctness standard. Nevertheless, the court deferred to the Chambre's
procedural choices.25
It must be acknowledged, however, that courts sometimes treat
procedural fairness as a matter of clear-cut rules rather than variable
standards. In such cases, courts may insist on correctness in the application
of these rules, at the expense of deference in the determination of the
content of procedural fairness. Such an approach is visible in Syndicat des
salaris de Biton St-Hubert-CSN c Biton St-Hubert.126
This case arose from a situation in which a worker had allegedly made
threats against his co-workers. Dismissed, the worker filed a grievance.
The employer asked the grievance arbitrator to allow the co-workers (the
targets of the alleged threats) to testify anonymously; the arbitrator agreed.
On appeal, the Quebec Court of Appeal held that allowing anonymous
testimony would be procedurally unfair. Although it opined that labour
arbitrators should have a great deal of flexibility with regard to process, it
held that the identities of the witnesses must be divulged in order to have
a proper adversarial process. The court explicitly invoked a correctness
standard. Correctness review is also found in other provinces and in the
context of other administrative regimes. For example, the Alberta Court
of Appeal applied a correctness standard when a medical review panel
cut off an employee's disability benefits without considering his written
submissions."' The same court applied a correctness standard when the
city of Edmonton, assessing property tax, failed to promptly notify the
property owner that the information it had provided was insufficient.28 In
both cases, the court declared the relevant procedures to be procedurally
incorrect.
125. For additional examples of correctness review observed only in the breach, see Irving
Shipbuilding, supra note 23 at paras 26, 45; Nova Scotia (Community Services) v NNM, 2008
NSCA 69 at para 40, 268 NSR (2d) 109 [NNM]; BowaterMersey Paper Co v Communications
Energy andPaperworkers Union of Canada, Local 141 (2010), 289 NSR (2d) 351 at paras 28,
32, 3 Admin IR (5th) 261 (CA) [Bowater].
126. 2010 QCCA 2270, [2011] RJDT 19. See also Syndicat des travailleuses et travailleurs
de l'H6telM~ridien deMontr&il c Guilbert, 2012 QCCS 1984, 2012 CarswellQue 4490 (WL
Can).
127. See Edmonton Police Association v Edmonton (City oj), 2007 ABCA 184, 283 DLR
(4th) 695.
128. See Boardwalk Reit LLP v Edmonton (City), 2008 ABCA 220 at paras 171-74, 299
DLR (4th) 332.
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I would therefore acknowledge that correctness review accurately
describes Canadian courts' approach to procedural fairness in some
cases. In these cases, the determination of compliance crowds out any
deference in the determination of the content of procedural fairness
requirements. There is therefore an unresolved tension in the law. The
Federal Court of Appeal explicitly acknowledged this tension in a 2014
judgment. In Re:Sound v Fitness Industry Council of Canada, Evans JA
surmised that "[tihere is a degree of tension implicit in the ideas that
the fairness of an agency's procedure is for the courts to determine on
a standard of correctness, and that decision-makers have discretion over
their procedure.""9
III. Is Correctness Review of Procedures Justified?
Should administrative procedures be subject to a correctness standard?
Indeed, should administrative procedures be subject to judicial review at
all? Various normative arguments can be offered in favour of correctness
review of procedures. However, I argue in this Part that there are also
convincing arguments for judicial deference on procedural questions, at
least in some cases. The uniform application of a correctness standard to
procedural questions would appear to be inappropriate.
Some of the arguments in favour of correctness review are essentially
formal, based on the idea of respect for law. One argument is that the
rules of procedural fairness or natural justice are legal rules and that courts
are therefore responsible for ensuring that they are respected. As Abella
J wrote for a unanimous Court in Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses'
Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), "the breach of a
duty of procedural fairness is an error in law'.13O This characterization
of procedural questions as legal questions implicitly invokes the formal
and institutional justifications typically offered for correctness review of
substantive legal questions, as discussed in Part II.
However, the fact-intensive nature of procedural fairness analysis
makes this characterization uncertain. As I have explained in the previous
Part, courts' analyses of the fairness of administrative procedures often
129. 2014 FCA 48 at para 39, [2015] 2 FCR 170 [Re:Sound].
130. 2011 SCC 62 at para 22, [2011] 3 SCR 708 [Newfoundland Nurses]. See also Uniboard,
supra note 122 at para 6; NNM, supra note 125 at para 40; Bowater, supra note 125 at para 28.
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begin with a contextual analysis of the procedures used; courts will then
ask whether these procedures were, on the whole, fair. Even where courts
approach procedural fairness as a matter of compliance with rules, the
inquiry is likely to be fact-intensive. Such an analysis is better characterized
as a mixed question rather than a pure question of law. As Iacobucci J put
it in Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v Southam Inc, a mixed
question is a question "about whether the facts satisfy the legal tests'
Diceyan constitutional theory, based on parliamentary sovereignty
and the rule of law, supplies an additional formal argument for correctness
review when it comes to statutory procedural requirements. When courts
ensure respect for these procedures, they are ensuring respect for legislation.
However, as Paul Daly emphasizes, respect for legislative intent can also
be an argument in favour of deference.32 Legislators sometimes explicitly
grant agencies discretion with regard to their procedures. For example,
in Council of Canadians with Disabilities, Abella J began her procedural
fairness analysis by noting that "Parliament entrusted the Agency with
extensive authority to govern its own process."33 This statutory grant of
power was one of the factors that led her to conclude that deference was
in order.
In other cases, legislators may have indicated their intention in a more
general way, such as through the use of a privative clause. For example,
in Bibeault v McCaffrey, the Court upheld the Quebec Labour Tribunal's
determination that certain employees were ineligible to testify because
they did not qualify as "interested parties" under the terms of the statute.34
Justice Lamer, as he then was, writing for a unanimous Court, held that
the strong privative clause in the statute extended to the question of who
qualified as an "interested party"; given this privative clause, courts should
not intervene.35 This formal justification for deferential review amounts
to a reformulation of the idea expressed in some of the older cases, such as
Komo Construction Inc c Commission des Relations de Travail du Quibec,136
that certain questions of natural justice are within the agency's jurisdiction.
It bespeaks a judicial concession to clearly expressed legislative will.
131. [1997] 1 SCR 748 at para 35, 144 DLR (4th) 1 [Southam].
132. Daly, "Canada's Bipolar Administrative Law", supra note 2 at 241-42.
133. Supra note 106 at para 230.
134. [1984] 1 SCR 176 at 188, 7 DLR (4th) 1.
135. Ibid at 182, 187.
136. Supra note 42.
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Moreover, as Roderick Macdonald observed, the Diceyan formalist
argument for correctness review cannot be extended to implied procedural
requirements (derived from the common law). The Diceyan conception
of the rule of law emphasizes judicial review as a way of ensuring that
state officials respect the limits of their special powers, but it has little to
say about the procedures followed by these officials.13
If we leave aside the formal legal nature of procedural requirements,
there are other essentially institutional (or "practical")13 arguments in
favour of correctness review. These arguments are essentially claims about
institutional competence. Thus, when courts hold that administrative
procedures should be subject to judicial review, they are saying that
administrative procedures require oversight and that courts should play
this oversight role. When courts hold that administrative procedures
must be reviewed according to a correctness standard, they are saying that
courts, rather than agencies, should have the last word over administrative
procedures.
It is important to distinguish these arguments about institutional
competence from arguments for procedural fairness in general. The
existence of procedural protections may be justified instrumentally,
according to the notion that they are likely to produce better substantive
outcomes. Alternatively, procedural protections can be justified on the
basis that they have an intrinsic value, understood either in terms of the
rights and dignity of the individuals affected or in terms of transparency
and accountability of public decision making.139 Arguments about judicial
oversight and standards of review are independent of this debate about the
justification for procedures in general. For the purposes of the standard of
review, it does not matter whether procedures are understood in intrinsic
or instrumental terms.
These institutional arguments begin with the premise that agencies
should not have absolute discretion with regard to their procedures.
Agencies may be inclined to sacrifice procedural fairness for the sake
of expediency or may lack the institutional capacity to objectively
137. See Macdonald, supra note 38 at 529-30.
138. Daly, Theory ofDeference, supra note 4 at 70-136.
139. See generally Carol Harlow & Richard Rawlings, Law and Administration, 3rd ed
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 618-21.
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assess the fairness of their own procedures. Administrative procedures
should therefore be subject to some kind of external review. However,
this argument for external review does not necessarily imply a role for
courts. One can imagine other ways of holding agencies accountable
for procedural fairness such as through more detailed procedural codes:
through ombudsman institutions or through specialized tribunals.14
Although the role of courts in overseeing administrative procedures is
constitutionally entrenched and unlikely to change soon, it is historically
contingent rather than conceptually necessary.
A principled argument for judicial review of administrative procedures
therefore requires an additional step: an argument about the role of courts.
An argument for judicial review according to a correctness standard,
moreover, implies a claim about the relative institutional capacity of
courts vis-a'-vis agencies. It implies that there is some basis for thinking
that courts, rather than agencies, should have "the last word" with regard
to administrative procedures.
An institutional argument for correctness review may also be linked
to the purportedly "legal" nature of procedural fairness requirements.
The Court has sometimes implied that courts possess superior expertise
in legal matters.141 However, as I have already noted, procedural fairness
is said to be a context-sensitive (and thus, fact-intensive) inquiry. In
many cases, procedural questions resemble mixed questions of fact and
law rather than pure questions of law. It might therefore be said that
questions of procedural fairness should be left to the decision maker most
familiar with the facts-i.e., the agency responsible for the initial decision.
140. See e.g. Macdonald, supra note 38. Macdonald recommends creating a board
composed of persons possessing specialized expertise in each of the different kinds of
processes employed in contemporary public administration: "custom, officially declared
law, adjudication, voting, managerial direction, contract, mediation, property and
deliberate resort to chance". Ibid at 19. This board would hear appeals regarding procedural
fairness and its remedies would emphasize mediation and prospective reforms. Macdonald's
classification of administrative functions is derived from Lon Fuller. See generally
Lon L Fuller, "The Forms and Limits of Adjudication" (1978) 92:2 Harv L Rev 353.
141. Pushpanathan, supra note 50 at para 37; Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, supra note 3,
Deschamps J ("superior courts have a core expertise to interpret questions of law" at para
162).
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An alternative institutional argument for correctness review could
be grounded on courts' relative expertise with regard to the procedures
themselves. Judges are experts in matters of adjudication. Their everyday
work requires them to oversee the precise details of adjudicative
processes, including issues such as the use of interim measures, the
disclosure of evidence, questions of standing and representation by
counsel, the assessment of the admissibility of evidence and the relative
weight to be accorded to it, the management of delays, and the awarding
of costs. One might argue that judges should have the last word because
they possess relative expertise in these matters. However, it is not clear
that courts possess expertise relative to administrative decision makers
with regard to non-adjudicative processes involving, for example,
rule making, funding allocations or the granting of licences. The
recognition of a flexible, context-sensitive duty of fairness, generally
applicable to most kinds of administrative decision making-and not
just judicial or quasi-judicial decisions-therefore undermines this
institutional rationale for the application of a correctness standard.142
Indeed, one might argue that agencies are better placed than courts to
answer certain procedural questions-they are in fact more expert than
courts with regard to their own procedures. Such a notion of relative
procedural expertise is at the heart of L'Heureux-Dube J's reasoning in
Baker's fifth factor when she notes that an agency may have "an expertise
in determining what procedures are appropriate in the circumstances".4
Notably, however, L'Heureux-Dub6 J also appeals to legislative intent,
emphasizing that deference is appropriate "particularly when the statute
leaves to the decision-maker the ability to choose its own procedures"44
The institutional justification also has a prominent place in Abella J's
reasoning in Council of Canadians with Disabilities.
145
Writing in the US context, Adrian Vermeule offers an additional
argument for recognizing agencies' relative expertise in matters of
procedure. Agencies' procedural choices are intertwined with their
substantive mandates. If courts are prepared to grant agencies deference
142. To be more precise, a generalized duty of procedural fairness expands the scope
of procedural protection beyond the set of decisions where correctness review could be
justified on institutional grounds.
143. Baker, supra note 67 at para 27.
144. Ibid.
145. Supra note 106 at para 231.
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with regard to substance, they should also acknowledge that agencies
may be best placed to determine the optimal procedural arrangements for
carrying out their substantive mandates.146
An analysis of the various normative arguments therefore shows
that the strength of these arguments is highly variable. The arguments
for correctness review of procedures are strongest where legislators
have subjected agencies to "general" procedural rules and manifested an
intention to have courts interpret and enforce these rules. They are also
stronger in the context of procedures that closely resemble adjudication.
These arguments are much weaker where legislators have explicitly or
implicitly granted agencies a certain amount of procedural discretion.
They are also weaker in non-adjudicative contexts.
IV. Dichotomous Standards of Review and the
Ambiguous Boundary Between Process and
Substance
In the previous Parts, I have cast doubt on the SCC's endorsement of
correctness review, drawing on formal authorities as well as principled
arguments. In this Part, I present yet another argument for skepticism
about correctness review of procedures, based on concerns about the
coherence of Canadian administrative law as a whole. The Court's recent
endorsement of procedural correctness review stands in stark contrast
to its move toward deference in substantive matters. This dichotomous
(or as Paul Daly calls it, "bipolar") approach to judicial review gives rise
to a further set of challenges, given that procedure is not always easily
distinguishable from substance.14
The argument in this Part is normative in the sense that it is informed
by values of legal coherence and predictability; however, these normative
concerns largely remain in the background. The bulk of this Part is
dedicated to a descriptive argument, aiming to demonstrate the ambiguity
of the process/substance distinction and the practical difficulties involved
in applying it. This descriptive account implies that correctness review
146. See Adrian Vermeule, "Deference and Due Process" (2015) Harv L Rev Working
Paper No 15-12, online: < papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2611149 >.
147. Daly, "Canada's Bipolar Administrative Law", supra note 2.
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of procedures, rigorously applied, would contribute to incoherence and
unpredictability; I suggest that this would be an unfortunate development.
The arguments for correctness review are premised on a clear
distinction between process and substance. This distinction was perhaps
most clearly expressed in CUPE v Ontario, where Binnie J declared that
"standards of review" applied only to substantive questions.14 Justice
Binnie acknowledged some points of overlap between courts' analyses of
procedural and substantive questions. However, he declared that, "while
there are some common 'factors,' the object of the court's inquiry in each
case is different".149 This process/substance distinction is crucial because,
since Dunsmuir, the Court has held that most substantive questions-
including many questions of law-are subject to review according to a
reasonableness tandard." The majority of the Court in Dunsmuir held
that a reasonableness tandard should "usually" apply, subject to certain
exceptions. These exceptions include "true questions of jurisdiction
or vires", questions of law that are "both of central importance to the
legal system as a whole and outside the adjudicator's specialized area
of expertise" and questions in which courts are required to draw
jurisdictional boundaries between two or more agencies.151 The general
application of a correctness standard to procedural questions thus depends
on courts' ability to distinguish these questions from substantive ones.
However, the distinction between process and substance is often
ambiguous.5 2 The cases reveal two main types of ambiguity. The first type
arises in situations where the agency either based its decision on grounds
not raised before the parties or failed to address issues raised by the parties.
Such "adjudicative unfairness" may raise doubts about he substance of the
decision or may be seen as a form of procedural unfairness. The second
type of ambiguity arises from the fact that agencies' procedural choices
may be treated as decisions in their own right and reviewed as such. Such
process/substance ambiguity means that the standard of review in many
cases depends on whether the issues are characterized as procedural or
substantive. This state of affairs gives rise to considerable uncertainty.
148. Supra note 10 at para 102.
149. Ibid at para 103.
150. See The Honourable John M Evans, "Triumph of Reasonableness: But How Much
Does It Really Matter?" (2014) 27:1 Can J Admin L & Prac 101 at 103.
151. Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, supra note 3 at paras 53-64.
152. See e.g. Dyzenhaus & Fox-Decent, supra note 87.
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Moreover, litigants have an incentive to manipulate the process/substance
distinction in search of their preferred outcome.
A. Adjudicative Fairness and the Duty to Give Reasons
Certain aspects of administrative processes are difficult to characterize
as procedural or substantive. Brown and Evans call one such aspect
"adjudicative fairness"-the notion that decisions must be based on issues
debated by the parties rather than other issues.153 Closely related is the
question of reason giving: an agency's obligation to explain and justify
the basis of its decision. Process/substance ambiguity surrounding these
aspects of decision making has been a source of uncertainty in Canadian
administrative law.
Lon Fuller's theory of adjudication explains the importance of
adjudicative fairness. Fuller conceived of adjudication as a model of
social ordering in which parties participate through the presentation of
proofs and reasoned arguments. From this analysis, Fuller deduced that
adjudication, by its very nature, required certain kinds of processes and
structures, such as an impartial decision maker as well as proceedings
initiated by someone other than the decision maker. Fuller also specified
that adjudication implies that the decision must be based on grounds that
the parties had an opportunity to address.54
The principle that a decision must be based on issues debated by the
parties does not apply to every kind of administrative process. There
are many processes in which it is appropriate for agencies to base their
decisions on "policy" considerations that may not have been fully explored
by the parties. This principle is important in processes based on the
model of adjudication, however. Given the prevalence of administrative
tribunals performing adjudicative functions, it is an issue that often arises
in practice.
Where decisions have been based on facts or arguments not debated by
the parties, courts have generally held these decisions to be unfair. Sheddy
v Law Society of British Columbia, for example, concerned a lawyer who
153. Donald JM Brown & The Honourable John M Evans, Judicial Review of
Administrative Action in Canada (Foronto: Carswell, 2014) (loose-leaf 3, 2015 supplement)
ch 14:4211 at 67-68.
154. Fuller, supra note 140 at 388.
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was charged with professional misconduct for notarizing a false affidavit. 5
A law society panel cleared the lawyer of professional misconduct, but held
that he was nevertheless guilty of incompetence. The BC Court of Appeal
held that the panel had breached the requirements of procedural fairness
by deciding the case according to an issue that was not before it.156 The
same pattern can be observed in Socidti d'habitation et de diveloppement
de Montrial c Syndicat descols bleus regroupis de Montrial, section locale 301
(SCFP/FTQ), in which a labour arbitrator based his decision on a recent
judgment that neither party had invoked in its arguments.15 Justice Dussault
held that it was procedurally unfair for the arbitrator to do so without
giving the parties a chance to respond.5  A similar issue arose in Re:Sound,
which dealt with a decision of the Copyright Board concerning the tariff
that fitness centres would have to pay to copyright holders for using
recorded music.'59 After holding a hearing on this issue, the Board obtained
additional information and used this information as a basis for computing
the tariff. The copyright holders contested this use of information that
had not been presented at the hearing. Justice Evans ultimately agreed,
holding that it was a breach of procedural fairness for the Board to base its
tariff on a ground that the parties did not know they needed to address.6
155. 2007 BCCA 96, 58 Admin LR (4th) 48.
156. Ibid at para 19.
157. 2005 QCCA 965, [2005] RJDT 1496.
158. Ibid at paras 30-31.
159. Re:Sound, supra note 129.
160. Ibid at para 77. For another example of characterizing the issue this way, see Syndicat
des employies et employis professionnels etde bureau, section locale 574, SEPB, CTC-FTQ c
Groupe Pages jaunes Cie, 2015 QCCA 918 at paras 38-46, 2015 CarswellQue 4879 (WL
Can). This case arose from a dispute between an employer and a union over changes to
the employees' pension plan. The decision turned on the interpretation of a letter of
agreement between the employer and the union. The arbitrator based his decision on his
own interpretation of the letter, which was neither that of the employer nor that of the
union. This interpretation had not been raised at the hearing, and the union alleged that the
arbitrator's means of arriving at his decision constituted procedural unfairness, reviewable
under a correctness standard. Justice Savard held that a correctness standard applied to
this question because it was procedural. However, she held that the arbitrator's decision
to consider a new interpretation of the letter was not procedurally unfair. She stated that
her conclusion would have been different if the arbitrator had considered new legal sources
without giving the parties a chance to respond or if one of the parties had been denied the
opportunity to present new evidence in response to the new interpretation. Ibid.
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Another kind of adjudicative unfairness may arise when the adjudicator
fails to address issues raised by the parties. In such situations, courts have
not followed any consistent approach. Some courts have treated these cases
as breaches of procedural fairness, reviewable on a correctness standard.
For example, in Turner v Canada (A G), a spurned applicant for a federal
public service job brought a complaint before the Canadian Human Rights
Tribunal, alleging discrimination on the basis of race as well as disability.161
The Tribunal rejected the allegation of racial discrimination, but its
reasons failed to address disability as an alleged ground of discrimination.
On judicial review, Turner argued that this failure to address one of his
allegations amounted to a breach of procedural fairness. Justice Mainville,
writing on behalf of the Federal Court of Appeal, accepted this argument,
applying a correctness tandard and overturning the Tribunal's decision.
162
However, an example of the opposite approach can be found in A TCO
Gas and Pipelines Ltd v Alberta (Energy and Utilities Board), in which a
gas company alleged belatedly (in a reply argument) that the Alberta
Energy and Utilities Board had no jurisdiction over certain facilities.
163
The Board explicitly refused to deal with these jurisdictional arguments.
On judicial review, ATCO alleged that this refusal amounted to a breach
of procedural fairness. The Alberta Court of Appeal disagreed and held
that the Board's refusal to deal with certain issues (if raised belatedly) was
within its discretion. 164
The Federal Court of Appeal reached a similar conclusion in Forest
Ethics Advocacy Association v National Energy Board,165 which arose from
the National Energy Board's hearings on the Enbridge Line 9 pipeline
project. The National Energy Board had chosen to focus only on the
pipeline itself and not to consider the environmental impact of Alberta
oil sands development or the ultimate combustion of the oil carried
by the pipeline. Justice Stratas characterized this as a substantive issue,
reviewable according to a reasonableness tandard.
161. 2012 FCA 159, 431 N-R 327.
162. Ibid at paras 38-45. See also Sketchley v Canada (Attorney General), 2005 FCA 404,
[2006] 3 FCR 392.
163. 2005 ABCA 226, 48 Alta LR (4th) 1.
164. Ibid at paras 16-21. See also Envoy Relocation Services Inc et al v Canada (Minister of
Public Works and Government Services), 2005 FCA 364 at para 7, 341 N-R 350.
165. 2014 FCA 245 at paras 63-69, 465 N-R 152 [ForestEthics].
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In 2015, Stratas JA confronted a similar set of circumstances in Bergeron
v Canada (A G). 166 In this case, a federal civil servant filed a complaint with
the Canadian Human Rights Commission alleging that the government
had discriminated against her by failing to accommodate her disability.
The Commission assigned an investigator to examine the complaint;
the investigator recommended that the complaint be dismissed because
Ms. Bergeron could have used other procedures (namely, a labour
grievance) to address the issue. The Commission issued a decision in which
it adopted the investigator's recommendation. Ms. Bergeron alleged that
the Commission's investigation had not been thorough enough, and she
argued that this alleged lack of thoroughness was equivalent to procedural
unfairness. Justice Stratas accepted, for the sake of argument, that this
question was procedural and that it was reviewable on a correctness
standard; applying this standard, he rejected Ms. Bergeron's arguments
and upheld the Commission's decision. Justice Stratas nevertheless noted
the blurriness of the process/substance distinction:
One might also query whether a failure to investigate thoroughly under the Act is a
procedural defect, triggering whatever standard of review applies to procedural matters.
A decision based on a deficient investigation can be characterized as one that is not
substantively acceptable or defensible because it is based on incomplete information,
thereby triggering the standard of review for substantive defects governed by Dunsmuir,
above."'
Justice Stratas described the current state of affairs for procedural
review as "a jurisprudential muddle" 68
Closely related to the question of adjudicative fairness is the question
of agencies' duty to give reasons. Indeed, cases in which the decision
maker fails to address certain arguments raised by the parties may also
be seen as cases about the adequacy of the reasons given.169 In Baker, the
Court established that common law procedural fairness requirements
could, under some circumstances, oblige administrative decision makers
to provide reasons.1" But the Court also noted that the reasoning
166. 2015 FCA 160, 474 NR 366.
167. Jbid at para 70.
168. Jbid at para 71.
169. See e.g. Bell Canada vAmtelecom Limited Partnership, 2015 FCA 126 at paras 24-25,
473 NR 298 [Bell Canada].
170. Baker, supra note 67 at para 43.
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provided by an administrative decision maker plays a key role in the
evaluation of the reasonableness of the decision.1"1 The giving of reasons
therefore has both procedural and substantive dimensions. The absence
or the inadequacy of reasons may be treated as either a procedural or a
substantive problem.
Recent case law provides examples of both approaches. For example,
in Clifford v Ontario,1"2 a dispute over pension benefits, the Ontario
Municipal Employees Retirement System Tribunal issued a ruling, but its
reasons were rather telegraphic. The Ontario Court of Appeal declared
that compliance with the obligation to give reasons is to be addressed on a
correctness standard, as part of the duty of procedural fairness. However,
it distinguished compliance with reason giving from an evaluation of the
content of reasons. In this case, it held that reasons given were adequate in
the circumstances and thus satisfied a correctness standard.'
However, the Court took a different approach in Newfoundland
Nurses.1"' In this case, a union argued that gaps in an arbitrator's reasoning
process were such as to amount to an absence of reasons and thus a breach
of procedural fairness, reviewable on a correctness standard. The Court,
however, drew a distinction between the absence of reasons (which could,
in some cases, amount to a breach of procedural fairness) and the giving
of fragmentary or substandard reasons (which should be evaluated in
terms of the substance of the decision). Newfoundland Nurses is generally
considered to have settled this issue. However, it has settled this issue on
the basis of a somewhat tenuous distinction: Where does one draw the
line between inadequate reasons and nonexistent reasons? For example,
what if an agency provides only generic, boilerplate reasons?1"5 What if
it simply copies and pastes from the submissions of the parties?1"6 The
artificiality of this distinction illustrates the judicial acrobatics sometimes
required in order to maintain the process/substance distinction-
and its accompanying dichotomy with regard to standards of review.
171. Ibid at paras 63-65.
172. 2009 ONCA 670, 98 OR (3d) 210.
173. Ibid.
174. Supra note 130 at paras 20-22.
175. See e.g. Komolafe v Canada (Minister of Citizensip and Immigration), 2013 FC 431,
16 Imm LR (4th) 267.
176. See e.g. University of Alberta v Chang, 2012 ABCA 324, 44 Admin LR (5th) 216
oudicial "cutting and pasting" described at paras 17-18).
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B. Procedural Choices as Decisions
In CUPE v Ontario, as quoted above, Binnie J drew a distinction
between the "manner" of making a decision and the "end product" of such
a process.1" In practice, however, such a distinction is not always evident.
In some cases, agencies' procedural choices may be treated as decisions
in their own right and thus subjected to judicial review according to the
standards set out in Dunsmuir. When this happens, such decisions are
likely to be characterized either as questions of discretion or as questions
of the interpretation of the agency's home statute. In either case, the
standard of review applied to these procedural choices will usually be
reasonableness. The possibility of treating procedural choices as decisions
thus provides a further source of uncertainty as to the applicable standard
of review for procedural questions.
Prassad v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) prefigures
this trend. That case dealt with an immigration adjudicator's refusal to
adjourn an inquiry. The adjudicator was operating under a set of regulations
that explicitly stated that the adjudicator "may adjourn the inquiry at
any time for the purpose of ensuring a full and proper inquiry" 7" Justice
Sopinka, for the majority, held that the adjudicator had validly exercised
his discretion to refuse the request for an adjournment and that such a
refusal was not procedurally unfair. By treating this procedural issue as a
matter of discretion, the Court was able to justify deference.
Likewise, in Deloitte & Touche LLP v Ontario (Securities Commission),
the Court examined a situation in which the Ontario Securities
Commission (OSC) had ordered an accounting firm to disclose its records
with regard to a company under investigation.9 The Ontario Securities
Act gave the OSC broad discretion to order disclosure if it was "in the
public interest"8 The Court held that the standard of review applicable
to the OSC's order was reasonableness and that the disclosure order was
in fact reasonable.
177. CUPE v Ontario, supra note 10 at para 102.
178. Prassad, supra note 111 at 567, citing Immzgration Regulations, 1978, SOR/78-172, s
35(1).
179. 2003 SCC 61, [2003] 2 SCR 713.
180. Ibid at para 6.
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A more recent example can be found in the Federal Court of Appeal's
decision in Maritime Broadcasting System Ltd v Canadian Media Guild
(Maritime Broadcasting),"'1 released just three weeks before Khela. At
issue was a labour dispute involving the question of membership in a
bargaining unit. The union and the employer both submitted information
to the Canada Industrial Relations Board after what was supposed to have
been the final date for submissions. Upon judicial review, the employer
argued that it had not had a proper opportunity to respond to the union's
final submissions. Justice Stratas noted that administrative procedures are
subject to a certain amount of discretion. He concluded that procedural
fairness could be assessed according to a reasonableness tandard and that
the procedures used in this case were in fact reasonable."8 2
In some cases, statutes stipulate explicit procedural rules rather than
granting agencies discretion over procedures. In Dunsmuir, the Court
held that agencies' interpretations of their home statutes will generally be
entitled to deference."8 3 The Court reinforced this guideline in subsequent
cases, turning it into a presumption.8 4 This presumption implies that
agencies' procedural choices, if derived from agencies' interpretations of
their home statutes, are reviewable according to a reasonableness rather
than a correctness standard. For example, in Alberta Teachers Association,
the Court considered the fact that the Alberta Information and Privacy
Commissioner had extended the timeline for its own inquiry beyond
the ninety-day period specified in the statute. A majority of the Court
held that this was essentially a question of statutory interpretation, one
specific to the administrative regime in question and within the decision
maker's expertise. A reasonableness tandard therefore applied, and the
decision was held to be reasonable."8 5
181. 2014 FCA 59, 455 N-R 115 [Maritime Broadcasting].
182. Ibid at paras 46-65. Justice Stratas also challenged Binnie J's statement in Khosa, supra
note 19, to the effect that Dunsmuir dictates a correctness standard for procedural issues:
"Dunsmuir did not actually do that." Ibid at para 53. Note that Stratas JA's two colleagues
on the bench, Webb JA and Near JA, concurred in the result but rejected Stratas JA's
choice of a reasonableness tandard. Ibid at para 74. See also Forest Ethics, supra note 165
(Stratas JA's decision).
183. Dunsmuir, supra note 3 at paras 53-55.
184. See e.g. Alberta Teachers'Association, supra note 21 at para 39; Rogers, supra note 59 at
para 11. But see Evans, supra note 153 at 107-11.
185. Supra note 21.
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Similar reasoning can be seen at work in Syndicat des employis d'Au
Dragon forg inc c Commission des relations du travail (Au Dragon forge), a
2013 decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal."8 6 In this case, two unions
were competing to be recognized as the bargaining agent for a group of
restaurant workers and each sought access to the other's membership list.
The Commission des Relations du Travail refused to disclose the lists,
citing section 36 of the Quebec Labour Code, which stipulates that union
membership must remain confidential. The reviewing judge held that this
confidentiality gave rise to a violation of the audi alterempartem principle,
reviewable on a standard of correctness." However, the Quebec Court of
Appeal overturned the reviewing judge's decision as well as the application
of a correctness standard. Justice Bich reasoned that what was at stake in
this case was not procedural fairness in general, but rather procedural
fairness in a particular legislative context, and that the Commission des
Relations du Travail was therefore entitled to deference.s
C. Justificationsfor Dichotomous Standards ofReview
The SCC has yet to offer any rationale for the dichotomy between
the standards of review applicable to procedural and substantive
questions. However, I would speculate that part of the explanation lies
in an assumption that procedural questions involve more formal legal
analysis-and less "policy" analysis-than substantive questions. I argue
that such an assumption is unwarranted.
186. Syndicat des travailleuses et travailleurs de ADF- CSN c Syndicat des employs d'Au
Dragonforg inc, 2013 QCCA 793, [2013] RJQ 831 [Au Dragon forge].
187. 2011 QCCS 3202, DTE 2011T-493.
188. Au Dragonforgi, supra note 186 at para 47. Interestingly, Bich JA drew an analogy
with Dori v Barreau du Quibec, 2012 SCC 12, [2012] 1 SCR 395 [Dore], which dealt with
the issue of discretionary decisions that infringe Charter rights. In Dori, the SCC held
that the justification of an infringement under section 1 of the Charter can be examined
by the reviewing judge as part of the analysis of the reasonableness of the decision. Ibid
at paras 57-58. In other words, per Dunsmuir, supra note 3 at para 58, the presence of
a constitutional issue does not automatically attract a correctness standard. Similarly,
Bich JA reasoned that an administrative decision maker may be entitled to deference in
determining how the rules of procedural fairness should apply in a particular statutory
context. Arguably, Bich JA could have simply held that section 36 of the Labour Code, as
a statutory provision, trumps common law rules of procedural fairness. The analogy with
Dori was not necessary to the decision in Au Dragonforgi.
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Courts' hands-off approach to substance reflects a recognition that
administrative law touches on highly sensitive questions of social and
economic regulation, questions that courts are sometimes ill-equipped
to answer. In National Corn Growers Assn v Canada (Import Tribunal),
Wilson J referred to
a growing recognition on the part of courts that they may simply not be as well
equipped as administrative tribunals or agencies to deal with issues which Parliament
has chosen to regulate through bodies exercising delegated power, e.g., labour relations,
telecommunications, financial markets and international economic relations. Careful
management of these sectors often requires the use of experts who have accumulated years
of experience and a specialized understanding of the activities they supervise.89
Not only do such questions sometimes call for specialized expertise,
they may also be highly political, requiring judges to choose among legal
interpretations more favourable to business, labour or consumers, for
example. Procedural questions appear to be more politically neutral. As
Peter Cane has suggested, courts' emphasis on procedural correctness
thus "expresses the conviction that people who cannot agree about ends
may nevertheless agree about means"."'
However, the idea that procedural matters are less "political" than
substantive questions-and thus more appropriate for correctness
review-is rather dubious. Administrative processes, like other legal
processes, tend to structure how decision makers understand issues, and
they allocate advantages and disadvantages to particular individuals or
groups. The Court's dichotomous approach-a hands-off approach to
substance, combined with strict, hands-on control of procedures-may
thus be based on a misleading image of neutrality.
The permeability of the process/substance distinction, combined
with the Court's dichotomous approach to standards of review thus
generates further doubts about correctness review of procedures. In
practice, this ambiguity has given rise to inconsistency. Courts are placed
in the awkward position of drawing boundaries between process and
substance in order to determine which standard of review should apply.
189. [1990] 2 SCR 1324 at 1336, 74 DLR (4th) 449.
190. Peter Cane, "Review of Executive Action" in Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet, eds, The
Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 146 at 156.
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Parties seeking to contest decisions have an incentive to frame their
grievances in procedural rather than substantive terms. Yet no convincing
rationale is offered for such a dichotomous approach and its accompanying
unpredictability.
V. Toward a Better Approach
This article is meant as a critique of an across-the-board application of
a correctness standard to procedural questions. In this final Part, I would
like to offer some preliminary thoughts toward a new approach. At the
same time, I will comment on the most elaborate alternative offered to
date: Paul Daly's proposal that procedural questions be incorporated
within the Dunsmuir framework.191
In my view, any new approach to judicial review for procedural
questions should be based on the considerations of principle that I have
identified, including legislative intent as well as relative institutional
capacities. In light of these considerations, the arguments for judicial
scrutiny of procedures are stronger in some cases than others. For example,
the arguments are stronger where such scrutiny is implicitly or explicitly
invited by statute; where the procedural protections at issue are derived
from "general" sources (such as the common law or general procedural
codes); or where the administrative process in question closely resembles
adjudication. Conversely, more judicial deference is warranted where the
legislature has implicitly or explicitly sought to make an agency master
of its own procedure, where the procedural issues are confined to the
idiosyncrasies of a particular statutory scheme, or where the underlying
administrative process consists of forward-looking, discretionary or
polycentric policy decisions.
I therefore agree with Daly, Vermeule and others that courts should
assume a deferential stance-i.e., that they should apply a reasonableness
standard-when they review administrative procedures. Courts should
begin by trying to understand agencies' procedural choices, determining
whether these choices are susceptible of some rational justification. They
should consider the reasons that agencies have given or could have given
for their procedural choices.
191. See Daly, "Canada's Bipolar Administrative Law", supra note 2.
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The application of a reasonableness standard to administrative
procedures need not mean judicial abdication. The deferential approach I
have in mind is consistent with David Dyzenhaus's notion of "deference
as respect",192 as endorsed in Baker193 and Dunsmuir.194 Courts can
adopt a robust approach to reasonableness analysis. Procedures and
interpretations that go against the grain of legislative intent, inconsistent
applications of general procedural rules or major departures from
adjudicative integrity are all good reasons for holding that an agency's
procedures were unreasonable. Such an approach to judicial review of
administrative procedures is consistent with widespread judicial practice.
As I have noted, reviewing courts often approach procedural questions
as they would approach questions of mixed fact and law, considering
how abstract legal norms apply in particular circumstances. They
often consider agencies' procedural choices in particular circumstances
before going on to determine whether these procedures made sense. The
approach I am proposing would essentially describe this approach for
what it is: reasonableness review.
Reasonableness hould not only be the presumptive standard when
courts review administrative procedures, it should be the only standard.
A robust approach to reasonableness review would be capable of
incorporating the factors that underlie arguments for correctness review,
including rule of law considerations as well as the respect for courts'
expertise in matters of adjudication. Such an approach has the additional
advantage of obviating the need for a two-step approach, in which courts
must first determine the standard of review and then apply it.195
192. "The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy" in Michael Taggart, ed,
The Province ofAdministrativeLaw (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1997) 279 at 286.
193. Baker, supra note 67 at para 65.
194. Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, supra note 3 at para 48.
195. As this article went to press, I became aware of a remarkable piece of extra-
judicial writing by Stratas JA of the Federal Court of Appeal: The Honourable Justice
David Stratas, "The Canadian Law of Judicial Review: A Plea for Doctrinal Coherence
and Consistency", 42:1 Queen's LJ [forthcoming in Fall 2016]. In this article, Stratas JA
suggests that Canadian administrative law could be improved by eliminating standards of
review altogether and simply focusing on the variable margin of appreciation that courts
should grant administrative agencies in matters of process as well as substance. Ibid. I am
sympathetic to Stratas JA's proposal. Although I have framed my recommendation in
terms of a reasonableness tandard, I think Stratas JA is right to suggest that a reform-
minded SCC might want to go even further.
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I am sympathetic to Daly's proposal for the "fusion" of procedural
and substantive standards, but I have certain reservations about such
an approach.196 Building on the work of judges such as Bich JA (in Au
Dragon forge) and Stratas JA (in Maritime Broadcasting), Daly has shown
how standards of review for procedural questions might be determined
according to the Dunsmuir framework. According to such an approach,
courts would presumptively apply a reasonableness standard to procedural
questions corresponding to the categories set out in Dunsmuir: procedural
questions involving fact, discretion, or policy; procedural questions of
mixed fact and law; and procedural questions involving the interpretation
of the agency's home statute. This approach would allow courts to
exhibit deference on most procedural questions, consistent with the
SCC's obiter from Baker and Khela. However, courts would still be able
to invoke a correctness standard with regard to questions corresponding
to the categories set out in Dunsmuir, including jurisdictional questions
and questions of general law.
Such a reform would have the advantage of harmonizing standards of
review for procedural and substantive questions. It would recognize the
fact that there is no clear conceptual separation between these two types
of questions. It would also eliminate the uncertainties I identified in Part
IV, above. In principle, such a harmonization should be possible. The
factors I have identified for procedural review have all been identified by
the Court as relevant to the standard of review for substantive questions,
including legislative intent,197 the generality or particularity of legal
questions198 and the distinction between binary and polycentric decision
making.199 Weaving together these strands of case law presents practical
challenges, but no conceptual problems.
However, such an approach would also have its shortcomings, as
Daly himself has intimated.2 0 It would place an additional burden on
the Dunsmuir framework for determining the standard of review. This
framework has been widely criticized, both for its vagueness and its
196. Daly, "Canada's Bipolar Administrative Law", supra note 2.
197. Pushpanathan, supra note 50 at paras 30-31; Dunsmuir, supra note 3 at paras 52, 55.
198. Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, supra note 3 at para 60.
199. Pushpanathan, supra note 50 at para 36; Dunsmuir, supra note 3 at paras 135-36.
200. Daly, "Canada's Bipolar Administrative Law", supra note 2, n 139.
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conceptual instability.2"1 In recent years, the Court has itself displayed a
certain ambivalence toward certain aspects of the Dunsmuir framework,
notably toward some of the categories of questions that are meant to
attract a correctness standard. As I have noted, the Court has come close
to eliminating the category of jurisdictional questions,20 2 and the Court
has shown itself reluctant to identify questions of general law in cases
where it might have done so.
203
The Dunsmuir framework also assigns a limited role to one factor
that I have identified as crucial: the diversity of institutions and processes
that make up the contemporary administrative state.204 Considerations of
institutional diversity may play a role in determining the standard of review
under the Dunsmuir approach, either through the use of precedents25 or
201. See e.g. David Mullan, "Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, Standards of Review and
Procedural Fairness for Public Servants: Let's Try Again!" (2008) 21:2 Can J Admin L &
Prac 117; Gerald P Heckman, "Substantive Review in Appellate Courts since Dunsmuir"
(2009) 47:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 695; Matthew Lewans, "Deference and Reasonableness Since
Dunsmuir" (2012) 38:1 Queen's LJ 59; Audrey Macklin, "Standard of Review: Back to
the Future" in Flood & Sossin, supra note 118 at 279. Daly has himself made important
contributions to this critical literature. See e.g. Paul Daly, "The Unfortunate Triumph of
Form Over Substance in Canadian Administrative Law" (2012) 50:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 317;
Paul Daly, "Dunsmuir's Flaws Exposed: Recent Decisions on Standard of Review" (2012)
58:2 McGill LJ 483.
202. See e.g. Alberta Teachers'Association, supra note 21 at paras 33-43, Rothstein J.
203. See e.g. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v Canada (Attorney General),
2011 SCC 53, [2011] 3 SCR 471; Nor-Man Regional Health Authority Inc v Manitoba
Association of Health Care Professionals, 2011 SCC 59, [2011] 3 SCR 616; Communications,
Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, Local 30 v Irving Pulp & Paper, Ltd, 2013 SCC
34, [2013] 2 SCR 458 [Irving Pulp &Paper].
204. The Dunsmuir framework has been held to apply to all kinds of administrative
decision makers. There was initially some ambiguity on this point. While addressing
administrative decisions in general, the majority reasons in Dunsmuir focus on
administrative tribunals. See Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, supra note 3 at paras 1, 33, 47,
54, 59, 64. See also Binnie J's criticisms of the majority reasons ibid at paras 120-23, 134.
However, this ambiguity has since been dispelled. See e.g. Catalyst Paper Corp v North
Cowichan (District), 2012 SCC 2, [2012] 1 SCR 5; Canadian National Railway Co v Canada
(Attorney General), 2014 SCC 40 at paras 53-54, [2014] 2 SCR 135.
205. Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, supra note 3 at para 57. For illustrations of this approach,
see Northrop Grumman Overseas Services Corp v Canada (Attorney General), 2009 SCC 50
at 10, [2009] 3 SCR 309; Agraira v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013
SCC 36 at para 49, [2013] 2 SCR 559; IrvingPulp &Paper, supra note 203 at para 7.
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through the vestiges of the old "pragmatic and functional approach"."6
Nevertheless, these considerations generally play a secondary role,
compared to the law/fact distinction and the application of the
"correctness" categories. I would speculate that the application of the
Dunsmuir analysis to procedural questions will highlight the difficulties
of recognizing institutional diversity under this framework.
Finally, the Dunsmuir framework also places too much emphasis
on the law/fact distinction, a distinction that is less relevant in the
procedural context. As I have emphasized, most procedural issues, when
characterized in terms of the law/fact distinction, will resemble mixed
questions of fact and law. Moreover, the law/fact distinction is often
malleable. As Binnie J explained in Dunsmuir, under the pragmatic and
functional approach, litigants seeking a higher standard had an incentive
to reframe mixed questions in more abstract terms, thus extracting "pure"
questions of law.2" It would be better to avoid the unnecessary exercise of
subjecting procedural questions to the law/fact analysis.
The approach I am recommending also differs significantly from the
Baker five-factor test. The appeal of the Baker test is that it makes room,
in its fifth factor, for deference to agencies' procedural choices. However,
the Baker approach is intended, at least in theory, to enable courts to
conduct their own independent determination of the requirements of
procedural fairness. It essentially treats deference as an afterthought. As
I have noted, courts have sometimes accepted this invitation to decide
for themselves what procedural fairness requires, assigning little weight
to agencies' procedural choices. In the approach I propose, deference,
combined with a robust form of reasonableness analysis, would be the
starting point.
206. Dunsmuir, supra note 3 at paras 63-64.
207. Ibid at para 142. For examples of the SCC extracting "pure" legal questions from
legal and factual matrices, see Rogers, supra note 59 at para 20; Livis (City) v Fraternitjdes
PoliciersdeLivisInc, 2007 SCC 14, [2007] 1 SCR 591. For comments on the malleability of
the fact/law distinction, see Southam, supra note 131, Iacobucci J. "The distinction between
law on the one hand and mixed law and fact on the other is difficult. On occasion, what
appears to be mixed law and fact turns out to be law, or vice versa." Ibid at para 35. See also
Morisette JA's comments in Fraternitj des policiers de la MRC des Collines-de-l'Outaouais
MRC c Mallette, 2010 QCCA 816 at para 27, 4 Admin LR (5th) 74. For another critical
reflection on the law/fact distinction, see Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays
in Interpretive Antropology (New York: Basic Books, 1983) at 167-234.
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What then would be left of the other Baker factors? They would all
become part of the reasonableness analysis. In this respect, it is perhaps
useful to distinguish the first Baker factor from factors two, three and
four. Factors two, three and four (the place of the decision in the statutory
scheme, including its finality; the importance of the decision to the persons
affected; and legitimate expectations) are all factors that have a direct
bearing on the level of procedural protections required. Agencies should
be expected to have considered these factors, and courts should hold them
accountable for the reasonableness of their choices in this regard. The first
factor, however-the extent to which an administrative process resembles
adjudication-pertains rather to the relative institutional capacities of
agencies and courts. The non-adjudicative nature of an administrative
process is a signal to courts that significant deference may be in order.
Conclusion
The articulation of a correctness standard for questions of procedural
fairness raises a number of concerns. From a doctrinal standpoint, it is
in tension with the Court's pronouncements in favour of deference. As
a matter of principle, there are good arguments for deference, at least
with regard to some aspects of administrative procedures. Moreover, the
uncertain boundary between process and substance (and the inconsistency
of the standards applied to these two types of issues) suggests that
correctness review, if consistently applied to procedural questions, would
produce incoherent and unpredictable results.
There is no simple answer to the question of how strictly courts should
control the procedures used by administrative agencies. The appropriate
level of scrutiny depends on a number of factors, including concerns for
formal legality as well as issues of relative institutional capacity. Moreover,
legislative intent can point in either direction, calling for strict supervision
or generous deference. The standard of review for questions of procedural
fairness should reflect these underlying tensions. I have argued that this
analysis is best accomplished through a robust reasonableness analysis.
Not only should reasonableness be the default standard for procedural
questions-it should be the only standard. Such a reform would help
simplify the judicial analysis of administrative procedures.
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I would like to think that the Court's holding in Khela, to the effect
that procedural fairness is subject to correctness review, may not be
the last word on the issue. The Court has yet to deal with this issue
in any depth; most of its statements on this point appear to be passing
remarks. And recent judgments of appellate courts show that the tensions
underlying procedural fairness analysis are becoming difficult to ignore.
208
A reassessment of these doctrines would be helpful in terms of theoretical
coherence as well as practical guidance.
208. See e.g. Au Dragon forgi, supra note 186; Re:Sound, supra note 129; Maritime
Broadcasting, supra note 181; Forest Ethics, supra note 165; Bell Canada, supra note 169.
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